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ABSTRACT

This study examines the return of Japanese Americans to Portland, Oregon,
following their mass incarceration by the United States Federal government between
1942 and 1945. This essay examines the motivations of both returning Japanese
Americans and various groups within the white community with equal focus in the
hopes of writing a history that provides agency to both groups. The return of Japanese
Americans to Portland was an event with broader implications than a mere chapter in
the history of Japanese Americans.
The rise of the Japanese Exclusion League and other groups interested in
preventing the return of Japanese Americans to Oregon had their roots partly in the
Oregon progressive coalition of the 1930s known as the Oregon Commonwealth
Federation (OCF). Unified behind the cause of public ownership of electricity
distribution, racially exclusive progressives such as Oregon Governor Walter M.
Pierce and civil rights progressives such as American Civil Liberties Union lawyer
Gus J. Solomon sought to protect Oregon’s producer class of farmers and workers
from exploitation by Portland business interests. After the dissolution of the OCF in
1940 and the attack on Pearl Harbor, the two progressive factions took opposite sides
on the issues of the rights of Japanese Americans.
In 1945, anti-Japanese organizers across the state, including Pierce, American
Legion officials, and Portland politicians called for the permanent exclusion of
Japanese Americans. The racist rhetoric of these organizers drew the ire of the
Portland Council of Churches, civic leaders, and War Relocation Authority officials,
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who formed the Portland Citizens Committee to Aid Relocation, the main white group
to help returners find housing and employment. Their arguments for tolerance
depended heavily on the story of Japanese American military service during World
War II.
Responding to the shape of debates within the white community, returning
Japanese Americans community leaders, especially Toshi Kuge and George Azumano
of the Portland Japanese American Citizen’s League (JACL), used the rhetoric of
military service to demonstrate their Americanness after World War II. The rhetoric of
valorous military service provided the ideological center of both remerging Japanese
American leadership organizations and connections between the Nikkei community
and white civic leaders.
After the reestablishment of Japanese American community organizations in
Portland, Issei leaders lead a successful fundraising campaign to support a legal
challenge to overturn the Oregon Alien Land Law and fund the Portland JACL.
Subsequently, between 1946 and 1948, the Portland JACL served as liaisons between
the Japanese American community and the white Portlanders interested in overturning
laws that challenged Issei social and economic rights. Despite their efforts, Japanese
Americans in the early postwar period, along with other Portland minority groups,
faced significant discrimination in housing options, employment, and even blood
supply. Their experience demonstrates both the power and limitations of arguments
for racial tolerance in the early postwar period.

iii

Dedication

For my father, the late Alan T. Hegwood, who fostered my love of history and
taught me that community service can be a way of life.

iv
Acknowledgements
A great many people in my life put up with, supported me, and offered much
needed guidance throughout this project. First of all, I would like to thank my wife
Amy, who patiently listened to my rambling explanations, suffered extreme boredom
during our vacations when I took the afternoon in the archives, and most importantly
provided the love and support that helped me develop confidence as a writer and
historian.
I would also like to thank my advisor, Kenneth J. Ruoff, for taking on a student
studying issues outside of his field, providing valuable advice for developing my
research, and making sure that I kept my eye on the next step in my career. I am
grateful as well to Hillary Jenks for sharing her extensive knowledge of the broader
context of Asian American history as well as insightful criticisms of early drafts of
this work. Thanks also to Katrine Barber and David A. Johnson of the Portland State
University History department for all their help with my thesis project, especially in
filling in the many gaps in my argument.
This project would not have been possible at all, though, had the Portland
chapter of the Japanese American Citizen’s League (JACL) had not been willing to
allow a complete stranger full access to their chapter’s archives. My heartfelt thanks
go to the JACL board and to Co-president Jim Kennedy especially. Their archives are
currently being organized under the able care of archivist Cristine Paschild, who also
deserves my thanks, at the Portland State University Library Special Collections
Department. My thanks go also to Oregon Nikkei Legacy Center’s Exhibit Director
Nicole Nathan for all of her help with my research.

v
Finally, thanks to Robert Findlay and Kat Cleland, who were my constant
companions and co-conspirators during my studies here at Portland State University.

vi
Table of Contents
Abstract

i

Dedication

iii

Acknowledgements

iv

Chapter 1:

Introduction

1

Chapter 2:

Progressivism and Class Conflict in the 1930s

14

Chapter 3:

“Despite Race, Color, or Creed”

49

Chapter 4:

Experiments in Acceptance

86

Chapter 5:

Successes, Failures, and Regular Minority Status

108

Chapter 6:

Conclusion

138

References

146

1
Chapter 1: Introduction

Demographically, Portland has a distinct place in the historiography of the
Japanese American experience. In 1940, just 4,071 Japanese Americans lived in
Oregon (1,617 Issei and 2,454 Nisei), of which 1,680 lived in Portland.1 Conversely,
California was home to nearly 94,000 Japanese Americans in 1942.2 Subsequently, the
majority of histories written about Japanese Americans before World War II, the
wartime incarceration of the 120,000 Japanese Americans living on the West Coast,
and the resettlement era between 1945 and 1952 focus on the experience of
Californian individuals of Japanese descent. For instance, Dorothy Swaine Thomas’
authoritative examination of the return of Japanese Americans to the West Coast
contains no statistics on Oregon Nikkei.3
On those occasions when Oregon does comes up in scholarship on Japanese
American resettlement, authors point to anti-Japanese racism, mainly in rural areas, to
show that it was widespread up and down the West Coast.4 Population statistics seem
to justify this academic focus. However, the small size of the Portland Japanese
1

Barbara Yasui, “The Nikkei in Oregon, 1843-1940,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 76 (September
1975), p. 253. Hito Okada, President Portland Japanese American Citizen’s League, Statement Before
House Defense Migration Committee, 26 February 1942, Hito Okada File, PDX JACL Collection.
2
War Agency Liquidation Unit, People in Motion: The Postwar Adjustment of the Evacuated Japanese
Americans, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 82.
3
Dorothy Swaine Thomas, The Salvage: Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement, (Berkeley:
UC Berkeley Press, 1952). People in Motion gives a similar report, focusing on factors that effected
Japanese Americans in postwar business and housing readjustment, but makes no substantive
examination of conditions in Oregon.
4
For instance, People In Motion, p. 69. Audrie Girdner and Anne Loftis, The Great Betrayal: The
Evacuation of the Japanese Americans During World War II, (London: MacMillan, 1969), p. 360.
Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America,
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), pp. 58, 74, 79-80, 127.
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American community is a major part of what makes it an ideal case study of how
Japanese Americans in the postwar era carved out a social and economic space for
themselves in an overwhelmingly white community.
The story of the return of Japanese American evacuees to Portland, Oregon, is
more than just one of coping with economic hardship and racial discrimination. The
return was also a time of negotiated social space and identity. While busy finding
work and housing in Portland between 1945 and 1948, Japanese Americans also
sought to secure the full rights and privileges of American citizenship for themselves
in legal codes and in the public eye. An understanding of the changing attitudes of the
white majority, especially progressives, is paramount to interpreting the strategies of
acceptance employed by self-proclaimed Japanese American community leaders.
This study examines Japanese American resettlement in Portland, Oregon, in
two respects. The first focuses on white progressives in pre-World War II Portland and
the very public debates over the rights of Japanese Americans during the Pacific War.
The second examines methods the Portland Japanese American Citizen’s League
(JACL) employed to establish Japanese American claims to the full rights of
American citizenship, their relationship to the white community, and the environment
of anti-Japanese discrimination in postwar Portland. Transnational, national, and local
conflicts and identity construction intersect in the story of the return of Japanese
Americans to Portland.5

5

As in Gary Y. Okihiro’s work, this thesis attempts to sketch out transnational, national, and local
dimensions of identity by placing Asian American history in a more central place, rather than treating
their experience as peripheral to larger movements. Okihiro uses an emphasis on Asian Americans to
recenter American history as a whole. Here the focus is far less ambitious, attempting to refocus and
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Chapter One focuses on how the roots of progressivism in Oregon are partly
transnational in origin. Progressivism in Oregon was both democratic and opposed to
Asian immigration. To understand the linkage, one must problematize the term
progressivism. In an attempt to historicize the story of progressivism in America,
historians have erected a dichotomy between more “authentic” progressives who
fought for economic and poltical rights despite race, religion, or creed and their
populist counterparts who were often known for their nativist sentiment. A quandary
for historians emerges from this dichotomy when attempting to make sense of figures
like Oregon Governor Walter M. Pierce, who was a progressive proponent of
democracy, but only for whites.6
A transnational focus helps make sense of this historical dilemma. In Drawing
the Global Colour Line, Marylin Lake and Henry Reynolds argued that an
international community of whiteness developed around the turn of the century that
“defined their identity and rights in racial terms: the right of Anglo-Saxons to selfgovernment and the commitment of white workers to high wages and conditions,
against those they saw as undermining their newfound status, whether they be
aristocrats or ‘coolies.’”7 In a way perhaps shocking to the contemporary perspective,

reinterpret the history of Portland, Oregon using a focus on Japanese Americans. See: Gary Y. Okihiro,
Common Ground: Reimagining American History, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2001), p. 17.
6

Recently, Oregon historian Robert R. McCoy conceptualized Pierce’s seemingly contradictory stances
as evidence of the coexistence dual political impulses in the early twentieth century. On one hand,
Pierce “maintained his belief in direct democracy, moral capitalism, and the defense of civil liberties
throughout his career.” On the other hand, he supported the nativist and racist attempts to racially purify
Oregon. McCoy portrayed Pierce as a paradoxical embodiment of these reactionary and progressive
impulse. See Robert R. McCoy, “The Paradox of Oregon’s Progressive Politics: The Political Career of
Walter Marcus Pierce,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 110.3 (Fall 2009), pp. 391-392.
7
Marylin Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the
International Challenge of Racial Equality, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), p. 7.

4
these whites were at once advocates of progressive democratic reform like women’s
rights and workers’ rights, but sought to create a homogeneous, racially white society.
In self-identifying white settler colonies in the majority of British Commonwealth
countries and in the American West Coast states, Chinese and Japanese immigrants
faced discrimination and wholesale exclusion. Racism and progressivism came from
that same impulse to create a more perfect democratic society, but only for whites.
Oregon’s exclusionary and progressive movements both fit this model, which
looks like a tortured version of progressivism from the modern perspective. Oregon
progressives before World War II saw the cause of democratic reform as a fight
between the ordinary man and monied interests. For progressive leaders like Pierce
and leaders of the Oregon Grange, seeking the full benefits of American citizenship
for the white worker meant opposing the interests of Portland financiers and
conservatives and their desire to introduce non-white workers. In the case of Oregon,
those non-white workers were largely Asians. This transnational political movement
will be referred to here as racially exclusive progressivism.8
In the 1930s, farm and labor groups in Oregon formed a broad progressive
alliance known as the Oregon Commonwealth Federation (OCF) in support of New
Deal programs.9 Although the OCF proclaimed an ideal of equality despite race,
8

This term is quite similar to Alexander Saxton’s “racially exclusive democracy” concept, which he
used to explain that, “If there was an American orientation to newcomers, it was not towards giving
equal opportunity to all, but towards inviting entry by white Europeans and excluding others.” By the
twentieth century, in Oregon, progressives interested in bettering the economic situation of working
class, white Americans, embraced racial exclusion. Conversely, conservatives and businesses interests
in Oregon opposed racial exclusion. Alexander Saxton, The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class
Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America, (London: Verso, 1990), p. 10.
9
Oregon Commonwealth Federation pamphlet, “And Now—the Truth About the Oregon
Commonwealth Federation,” Pierce Collection, University of Oregon Archives, Collection 68, Box 20,
Folder 1.
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religion, or creed, they mainly focused on ensuring that the abundant electricity
produced by the 1930s era construction of hydroelectric dams on the Columbia River
benefited Oregon’s working class. When their efforts failed in a series of ballot
measures around 1940, the OCF collapsed. The collapse of this progressive coalition
left Oregon’s progressives dispirited and disorganized.10 Progressives like lawyer Gus
J. Solomon, who became an advocate on behalf of returning Japanese Americans,
were silent as the Army rounded up Japanese Americans and placed them in
incarceration camps in 1942. Other former members of the OCF, like Pierce and
Oregon Grange officials, actively pursued the exclusion of Japanese Americans
following Pearl Harbor.
Chapter 2 examines the shift in power between pro- and anti-Japanese groups
in Portland. Interpretations of Oregon progressivism have rendered previous locallevel examinations of the Japanese American return problematic, especially in their
interpretation of anti-Japanese movements. Labeling Oregon’s anti-Japanese
movement before, during, and after the Pacific War as a reactionary rural movement
represents an unconscious attempt to divorce racially exclusive progressivism from
postwar civil rights progressivism.
However, Portland was as much a center of public anti-Japanese activity as
anywhere else in Oregon before and during World War II, until the press turned
against the movement in late 1944. Although Portland business interests argued
against anti-Japanese measures consistently until World War II out of fear of losing

10

Harry H. Stein, Gus J. Solomon: Liberal Politics, Jews, and the Federal Courts, (Portland, OR:
Oregon Historical Society Press, 2006), 71.

11
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the lucrative shipping trade with Japan, they did little to aid Japanese Americans.
Portland’s business leaders made their attitudes toward Japanese Americans plain in
the wake of Pearl Harbor. Free from the necessity of maintaining good relations with
Japan, the Chamber of Commerce aligned Portland City Council revoked Japanese
business licenses and called for the internment of Japanese Americans.12
Although confrontational public displays of anti-Japanese behavior in Portland
subsided by mid-1945, anti-Japanese discrimination did not cease. During the Pacific
War, an alliance of pro-Japanese groups sprung up in Portland in opposition to calls
for permanent Japanese exclusion. Especially after the Hood River controversy in late
1944 and early 1945, Portland progressives and church groups sought to quell antiJapanese sentiment as a way to demonstrate Portland’s fair-mindedness. Due to their
opposition of perceived racist fascism and out of guilt for their failure to stand up for
Nikkei civil rights in 1942, progressive Gus J. Solomon, former Governor Charles
Sprague, and others engaged in a series of public battles with anti-Japanese organizers
over the loyalty and legitimacy of Japanese American claims to the full rights of
American citizenship. Groups like the Portland Council of Churches were chiefly
interested in eliminating the spectacle of anti-Japanese discrimination.13 The
importance of the narrative of Nisei military service to the pro-Japanese argument can
hardly be overstated.

11

Arthur H. Bone, Oregon Cattleman/Governor, Congressman: Memoirs and Times of Walter M. Pierce,
(Portland, OR: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1981), p. 191.
12
Eisenberg, p. 544.
13
For an in depth study of anti-Japanese rhetoric in the media as spectacle see: Emily Roxworthy, The
Spectacle of Japanese American Trauma: Racial Performivity and World War II, (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 2008).
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In 1945, the Portland Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation, an ad-hoc
committee of Portland civic, religious, and progressive leaders formed in February
1942, made public anti-Japanese rallies in Portland impossible. They then spoke out
against anti-Japanese organizers, like Pierce and the Japanese Exclusion League, in
rural meetings, creating an illusion that opponents of the Japanese American return to
Oregon were backwoods racists. Emerging postwar civil rights progressives sought to
define themselves in opposition to this rural, reactionary other. Thus racially exclusive
progressivism was reimagined with rural origins. In the majority of scholarship on
Japanese Americans in Oregon, the rural towns of Hood River and Gresham emerge as
centers of anti-Japanese activism. Alternately, Portland was portrayed as a place
uniquely friendly to returning Japanese Americans because of the work of church
groups and civic leaders to combat “race baiting.”14
The debate over the return of Japanese Americans in Oregon formed along the
lines of Gary Gerstle’s conception of civic versus racial nationalism. Racially
exclusive progressives of the anti-Japanese alignment harbored a conception of
America as “held together by common blood and skin color and by an inherent fitness
for self-government.” Civic nationalists, that is, War Relocation Administration
officials, civic leaders, progressives, and church leaders, instead espoused a
“democratic universalism” based on concepts of equality and inalienable rights to

14

For Two examples see Beatrice Stevens, Free and Equal: The Japanese Americans in Oregon,
(Portland, OR, 1945), and Marvin Gavin Pursinger, Oregon’s Japanese in World War II: A History of
Compulsory Relocation, Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1961.

15
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liberty. The movement to intern Japanese Americans was a spasm of racial
nationalism, as expedited by the Pearl Harbor Incident, or as Eiichiro Azuma
described the movement, “an amalgamation of nationalism and racism which
culminated in a complete polarization between things Japanese and things American in
each warring state.”16 Alternately, the public reaction against anti-Japanese racism in
1945 was a surge of civic nationalism.
Chapter Three examines Japanese American attempts to establish their claims
to the legal and social benefits of American citizenship in the postwar era. As
Tetsuden Kashima observed, the decade after wartime incarceration was a time of
crisis, not a period of smooth transition into a model minority status.17 In Portland, this
crisis took the form of continuing discrimination by the Portland City Council and
other Portland officials who maintained earlier perceptions of them as the Japanese
“other” along wartime lines.18 Although Daiichi Takeoka, Ted Hachiya and other
Japanese American community leaders waged successful campaigns against legal
barriers to the economic livelihood of Japanese Americans in Oregon, Portland
realtors continued to bar them from living in white neighborhoods. Japanese
Americans also continued to face discrimination in hiring, and vandals continued to
desecrate the Portland Japanese cemetery.

15

Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century, (Princeton: Princeton
UP, 2001), p. 4.
16
Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America,
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), p. 209.
17
Tetsuden Kashima, “Japanese American Internees Return, 1945 to 1955: Readjustment and Social
Amnesia,” Phylon, Vol 41, No. 2, (2nd Qtr., 1980), p. 108.
18
As John W. Dower has explained, the Pacific War was quite nearly a race war between Japan and the
United States, at least in terms of the two countries’ propaganda. See, John W. Dower, War Without
Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, (New York: Pantheon, 1986).
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Japanese Americans returning to Portland employed several strategies to gain
acceptance. According to the papers of the Portland Japanese American Citizen’s
League (JACL), the chief strategy employed by Portland Issei and Nisei was a
connection to the 442nd Army Regimental Combat Team’s narrative of valorous
service during World War II. In an environment of continuing discrimination, the
Portland JACL and Japanese Ancestral Society publicly connected to the 442nd’s story
to legitimize claims of loyalty and to support arguments that they deserved the full
benefits of American citizenship, in campaigns such as the 1947 court challenge to the
1945 updating of the Oregon Alien Land Law.
Portland JACL leaders Toshi Kuge and George Azumano used this tactic,
referred to here as the Nisei Patriotism argument, to avoid a more direct confrontation
with the American public over their civil rights while attempting to distance
themselves from their Japanese identity. The Nisei Patriotism argument was an
attempt to engage civic nationalists without inflaming racial nationalists. On a
symbolic level, JACL leaders used this argument to portray Nisei combat troops in the
guise of a patriotic, white American soldier. During World War II, anti-Japanese
arguments in the press often idealized soldiers and military leaders such as Douglas
MacArthur as the chief line of defense against a monstrous racially-monolithic
Japanese other.19 Both civic leaders, such as E. B. Macnaughton, and many U. S.
soldiers themselves resented portrayals of American military forces as “missionaries

19

Roxworthy, p. 109.

20

10

for Jap hating.” Both JACL leaders and War Relocation Authority officials, the
administrative authorities in charge of Japanese internment camps, reclaimed the
image of the American soldier as fighting for democracy despite race, religion, or
creed through descriptions of Japanese Americans fighting the forces of fascism.21
Chapter 4 describes the successes and limitations of the Portland JACL as a
community group and political movement between 1947 and 1948. Postwar national
JACL policy directives, as implemented in Portland, sought to rely on white civil
rights progressives as public advocates for Japanese American civil rights. The JACL
attempted to regularize this process through local-level and national AntiDiscrimination Committees. These committees created Caucasian advisory boards,
essentially groups of white civic leaders that supported them during the early return
period, that could be counted on to write to their congressman on behalf of laws
favoring Japanese Americans. The JACL literally sought to make whites the authors of
full citizenship for Japanese Americans.22 This JACL tactic allowed civic nationalists
to argue for the civil rights of Japanese Americans without exorcising concepts of
cultural and racial difference, thus laying the ground work for the model minority
conception of Japanese American identity.23

20

Eleanor N. Forden.“Stands by Local Japanese,” Oregon Journal, 12 March 1945 and “Service Men
Tolerant,” Oregonian, undated March 1945, Mizuta Scrapbook, George Mizuta, Microfilm 154, Oregon
Historical Society Research Library.
21
Examples of this argument are abundant in newspapers written by the Nisei in incarceration camps
such as the Minidoka Irrigator and Heart Mountain Sentinel. For an example dealing with Oregon, see:
Kimi Tambara, “An Appeal to Courage,” Minidoka Irrigator, 24 March 1945, p. 4. The WRA also
produced numerous public information pamphlets like “Nisei in the War Against Japan” and others.
22
There is an interesting correlation here between Japan’s postwar constitution, written by members of
U.S. Occupation staffers, and postwar JACL dependence on white allies in legislative campaigns that
may be fruitful for further explanation.
23
The Model Minority conception of Asian American history sought to explain the success of Asian
Americans in the American, capitalist economic system through cultural differences, such as a tradition
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Throughout the internment period, the national JACL had sought to enforce
submission to military authority, at times denouncing Japanese Americans bold
enough to challenge curfew orders, and at other times failing to support court cases
testing anti-Japanese statutes.24 Because public perceptions of loyalty were the
currency of campaigns for legal redress, the national JACL wanted firm control of
Japanese American requests for recognition of their constitutional rights. After the war,
JACL leaders in Portland were given a narrow path on which to challenge racial
discrimination, limiting their ability to make common cause with other minorities.
The JACL emphasis on the Nisei patriotism argument dovetailed with the
needs of the white community, but alienated large portions of the Japanese American
community, especially, when they returned home to find that embracing the American
national identity did not prevent continuing discrimination in employment and
housing.25 Furthermore, many Japanese Americans, such as the Voice of the Nisei
movement, active during internment and the National Council for Japanese American
Redress, active in the 1970s, continued to view the JACL as collaborators in the
Nikkei incarceration.26 This alienation survives in numerous Portland JACL accounts
of widespread disinterest in chapter activities. Only a fraction of the Portland Nisei

of Confucianism. This conception allowed scholars to continue seeing Asians as the “other” while
maintaining a belief that American society had reached a stage of racial equality. Essentially cultural
difference replaced taboo concepts of racial difference. Chih-Chieh Chou, “Critique on the Notion of
Model Minority: An Alternative Racism to Asian American?” Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 9, No. 3, October
2008, p. 219.
24
Stephanie Bangarth, Voices Raised in Protest: Defending North American Citizens of Japanese
Ancestry, 1942-1949, (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2008), 156-174.
25
Caroline Chung Simpson, An Absent Presence: Japanese Americans in Postwar American Culture,
1945-1960, (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2001), 73.
26
Brian Masaru Hayashi, Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment,(Princeton,
NJ: Princeton UP, 2004), p. 186. Alice Yang Murray, Historical Memories of Japanese American
Internment and the Struggle for Redress, (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2008), p. 2.
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community joined the JACL in the early post-internment era. Of that fraction, few
were willing to participate in leadership roles. Therefore, only a handful of Portland
Japanese Americans shouldered the burden of implementing the JACL program in
Portland.
Activities and causes that garnered the most support and participation on the
part of the Portland Japanese American community were those that dealt with local
economic and social problems. In 1946, Portland Issei leaders sought legal acceptance
through support of the Oregon Alien Land Law Test Case Committee.27 At the height
of the debate over Japanese American return in 1945, the legislature had passed a
measure strengthening the 1923 Alien Land Law along the lines of the California
model.28 Unlike Japanese Americans in California, landowners in Oregon had not
previously faced an effort by the state to seize Issei farms with deeds under their
children’s names.29 Despite the lack of a direct threat, the Portland-based Community
Affairs Council, a joint Issei-Nisei community group, formed the test case committee
to avoid future loss of property.
The Alien Land Law Test Case Committee enjoyed broad-based financial
support, especially among Issei, because their program would aid all Japanese
Americans. Such economic efforts more fully represented the desires of the Japanese
American community than did the JACL, who rankled many because of perceptions
that the organization collaborated in internment and that it was only interested in
27

Eiichiro Azuma, “A History of Oregon’s Issei, 1880-1952,” Oregon Historical Quarterly, Winter
1993-1994, 356.
28
Amy K. Buck, “Alien Land Laws: The Curtailing of Japanese Agricultural Pursuits in Oregon,”
Masters Thesis, Portland State University, 1999, p. 73.
29
Charlotte Brooks, Alien Neighbors, Foreign Friends: Asian Americans, housing, and the
Transformation of Urban California, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 181.

13
aiding the Issei in a bid to position themselves as leaders of the Japanese American
community.
Despite the distinct challenges facing the Portland JACL, it served as the main
organizational contact between the Japanese American community and the white
community. Because of this contact, the JACL was able to garner larger Japanese
American community participation in economic issues such as during efforts to
document personal losses as part of 1948 Evacuation claims legislation and to aid
victims of the 1948 Vanport flood. Portland JACL leaders were the chief agents
working with the emerging civic nationalist consensus in Portland in the postwar era.

14
Chapter 2: Progressivism and Class Conflict in the 1930s

Oregon as a whole and Portland in particular has existed since its founding in
the midst of local, national, and international discussions about progressivism. In the
nineteenth century, citizens of British Commonwealth countries, along with those in
California and other West Coast American states, sought to create more democratic,
but also homogeneously white, societies because they believed whiteness was a
prerequisite for democratic civilization.
Transnational conversations on Asian immigration by British writers like
Charles Pearson, ‘trust-busting” U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, and Oregon
Governor Walter M. Pierce tied reforms to aid the white working and middle classes
to arguments for nonwhite exclusion, forming an ideological movement, termed here
as racially exclusive progressivism, by the turn of the century. This impulse found its
form partially through exclusion laws, such as California’s 1913 Alien Land Law and
Oregon’s 1923 Alien Land Law, which were designed to shore up white economic
status in the face of perceived racial threats. The Democratic Parties of California and
Oregon embraced the same impulse, eventually fueling calls for Japanese internment
in 1942. Because of Oregon’s history of racially exclusive progressivism preceding
World War II, anti-Asian sentiment was often a major force in Portland and wider
Oregon politics. Understanding Pierce’s role in various anti-Japanese movements,
during his years as Oregon State Senator in 1902-1906, as Oregon Governor from

15
1923 to 1927, and U. S. Representative from 1932 to 1942, helps explain how pre1930 Oregon progressivism fits into this racially exclusive progressive model.
The majority of scholarship dealing with anti-Japanese movements in Oregon
has ignored progressivism’s role in Japanese exclusion. Oregon historians instead tend
to focus on rural organizations like the Grange, the Hood River American Legion, or
the Gresham-based Japanese Exclusion League. Meanwhile, calls for exclusion by
Portland’s progressive leaders enter at the margins, if at all. In both popular histories,
like the story of the Hood River Yasui Family told in Stubborn Twig and in more
academic histories such as Linda Tamura’s Hood River Issei, anti-Japanese activism in
Oregon is portrayed with solely rural origins.30
Likewise, scholarship on Oregon progressivism deals with racially exclusive
progressivism through bifurcation. Pierce provides a useful example in this regard as
well. Discussions of Pierce often juxtapose his advocacy of the Oregon System of
referendum and initiative near the turn of the century and his full-fledged support for
the New Deal against his ideological commitment to eugenics and Japanese exclusion.
The contradiction is a product of historiography. In the 1970s, historians tried to make
sense of the progressives by dividing them into to groups, “urban liberals” and “old
stock, patrician farmers,” leading to the conclusion that one group represented

30

Lauren Kessler, Stubborn Twig: Three Generations in the Life of a Japanese American Family,
(Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 2005). Linda Tamura, The Hood River Issei: An Oral
History of Japanese Settlers in Oregon’s Hood River Valley, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press,
1993). See also: Marvin G. Pursinger, “Oregon’s Japanese in World War II: A History of Compulsory
Education,” Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1979. Amy K. Buck, “Alien Land Laws,”
Master’s Thesis, Portland State University, 1999. Anne Francis Galiskey, “Repressive Populsim and the
Internment of Japanese Americans of the Pacific Northwest,” Master’s Thesis, Portland State
University, 2003.
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“genuine progressivism” and the other a “false progressivism.” Following this trend,
31

a recent study of Pierce describes his ideology as deeply contradictory and goes so far
as to divide his history into two conflicting legacies: one section focuses on Pierce’s
democratic reforms, the other section focus purely on his discrimination.32 Pierce’s
ideology was not schizophrenic; it merely has previously unrecognized transnational
ideological origins.
The Portland City Council was also distinctive in its belligerence towards the
Nikkei after the Pearl Harbor incident, being the only city on the West Coast to revoke
Issei municipal business licenses. Furthermore, Portland was notable for the lack of
white public outcry against the policy of internment at a series of Congressional
hearings held in February of 1942. Known as the Tolan Committee hearings, these
hearings intended to poll public sentiment about President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
Executive Order 9066, the directive responsible for the internment of West Coast
Nikkei during World War II.33 Historical understandings of Portland as a place of civil
rights progressivism before Japanese American incarceration thus cannot be borne out
by the historical record. That view both disinherits the legacy of racially exclusive
progressivism in Portland, and paints rural Oregon as the source of reactionary racial
politics.
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Civil rights progressives in 1930s Oregon, such as the lawyer and later federal
judge Gus J. Solomon and labor activist Monroe Sweetland, failed to speak out against
Japanese incarceration because of their close ties to Pierce and other racially exclusive
progressives. Both groups worked together during the 1930s through the Oregon
Commonwealth Federation (OCF), which brought together labor, farm, and civil rights
progressives to support New Deal policies, especially the construction of hydroelectric
dams on the Columbia River. In the 1930s, public power absorbed the majority of the
combined energy of Oregon progressives.
The subsequent collapse of the OCF in 1940, due to the failure of a series of
public power ballot initiatives, imploded the meager networks of civil rights
progressive advocacy.34 This collapse left the Nikkei without white allies in the face of
hostility from the Portland City Council, anti-Japanese progressives advocating for
exclusion, and business leaders who saw internment as a financial opportunity. This
study seeks to include transnational, national, and local-level focuses to understand the
belligerence of the 1942 Portland anti-Japanese political alignment while exploring the
silence of white advocates for the constitutional rights for Japanese Americans.
Transnational Origins
In 1850s Victoria, Australia, there was a gold rush in which “hundreds of
thousands of people arrived from all over the world.”35 By 1854, 10,000 of these
immigrants were Chinese farmers and traders from Canton seeking their fortunes
abroad. According to historians Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, “European miners
34
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criticized the Chinese because of their alien customs, clannishness, lack of women,
labour competition, and fast increasing numbers.”36 In response to the idea of being
overrun by a possible deluge of Chinese immigrants, the people of Victoria called
upon parliament to pass the Immigration Restriction Act of 1855. This act defined the
Chinese in racial terms, placed a tax on incoming Chinese, and limited their
immigration to one Chinese per every ten tons of cargo shipped to the colony. Labor
unions and other colonists argued for Chinese exclusion based on a belief that “the
ideal colonist was European, civilized, and a family man.”37
The intent for this and subsequent immigration restriction was homegrown, but
the legal model of exclusion used by the Victorian parliament originated in California.
In 1850, responding to fears that individuals unable to obtain citizenship were also
reaping benefits of the post-1848 gold rush, the new California legislature passed a
head tax of twenty dollars on all “foreign” miners, including French and Australian
miners. The law was intended to remove Mexican and Chinese miners from claims in
the state. In 1852, the Foreign Miners Law was revamped charging only $3, but
required all Chinese men to pay the tax before they could mine their claim. Enforced
by an army of independent tax collectors, the 1850 and 1852 Foreign Miners Laws led
to the expulsion of tens of thousands of Mexicans and Chinese.38 Head tax laws were
only the first of many laws Australia based on the Californian example.
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Ideological support for exclusion measures in both states was similar as well.
In California and Victoria, some advocates for the working class believed that the
“white worker was the bearer of civilization.”39 White laborers in the post-bellum
period moving to California defined themselves in opposition to the nearly fifty
thousand Chinese laborers who represented one quarter of the labor force in the 1870s.
White laborers occupied nearly all jobs of skill and prestige and sought further
benefits from their white employers like the eight-hour day and safer working
conditions. When unions struck to obtain these benefits, labor contractors from the Six
Companies of San Francisco often sent in Chinese laborers to replace them,
reinforcing the belief among white laborers that “their Asiatic fellow workers…were
too docile, too slave-like, to be able to ever to stand on their own feet in a free
society.”40 Chinese laborers were, in their view, unworthy as possible citizens and a
threat to their fight for better wages and conditions. This is just one example of the
intersection between progressivism and fears of a racial other.
In the 1880s, Victorian liberal legislator Charles Pearson framed these fears
around a number. Arguing in support of an exclusion bill, Pearson stressed that the
Chinese presented a profound threat to white civilization because the “natural increase”
of their 400 million citizens would swamp the small populations of the white settler
colonies surrounding the Pacific.41 Increasingly, the white working class of both states
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claimed that the capacity for self-government was the preserve of the Anglo-Saxon
race. This racially exclusive progressivism was highly transportable among territories
and states with British heritage, including Oregon.
Unlike the belief of some Oregon legal scholars, racism in Oregon was not
“particular to its time and place.”42 Rather, it was heavily influenced by a transnational,
racially exclusive progressivism. Debates around the first Oregon constitution shows
that exclusion of nonwhite groups had broad-based support. In 1857, the Oregon
territorial legislature formed a constitutional convention. Key figures on the
commission such as Chief Justice George Henry William “urged his colleagues to
‘consecrate Oregon to the use of the white man, and exclude the Negro, Chinaman,
and every race of that character.’”43 William was overruled on the Chinese issue,
likely because key figures were interested in them as a source of cheap labor, but other
measures of exclusion made their way on to the ballot in November of 1857. Oregon
voters chose not only to ban slavery (7,727 to 2,645) but also to bar free blacks and
“mulattoes” from entering Oregon (8,640 to 1,081).44 In 1860, the Oregon legislature
followed a more explicit California-Australia model by increasing the tax against
Chinese miners in Oregon.45
Opposition to slavery in Oregon stemmed from a desire to make Oregon an
ideal place for white settlers. Banning slavery, as proposed by the Free Soil party in
Oregon territory, was much more about keeping African Americans out of the territory
42
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than it was about the moral opposition to slavery. Free Soilers claimed that, “Slavery
degraded white labor. It reduced white farmers, mechanics, artisans, and
workingmen—indeed, everyone except the slave owner—to the debased status of the
slave.”46 The anti-slavery consensus was highly successful in keeping African
Americans out of Oregon until World War II demands for labor sparked the first large
influx of black migrants.47
Chinese were the only “visible minority” in Oregon until the 1880s, at roughly
ten thousand members. Portland had a particularly high percentage, as high as twenty
to twenty five percent in the mid-1880s, when white workers in Portland took to the
street to demand the eviction of the Chinese from Portland.48 Like Australian miners
and California laborers, white workers in Oregon “considered themselves robbed” of
their livelihood by the Chinese.49 The complaints of Oregonians echoed a chorus of
calls around the Pacific for the exclusion of the Asians in the interest of the
preservation of the white race.
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Racially Exclusive Progressivism at the National Level
Around the turn of the century President Theodore Roosevelt’s political ideas
and practices illustrated this larger definition of progressivism. Roosevelt stood for a
variety of progressive causes, ranging from support for diminishing concentrations of
wealth to supporting the creation of national parks, but he also supported the
transpacific conversation about the protection of white men’s countries. These theories
led white race proponents to think of Asians in international or transnational racial
categories. In this framework, Anglo-Saxons and other transatlantic whites represented
races fit for democracy.
Roosevelt became enamored of the idea of Anglo-Saxon civilization theories
in his college years, leading him to maintain beliefs in the progress and superiority of
white civilization. In 1894, he read a book that gave him a great cause for concern
about the future of that civilization.50 Australian Charles Pearson’s book National Life
and Character confronted Roosevelt with a number of realities about racial
demographics. Pearson argued that “black and yellow” races would eclipse white
civilization because whites had both a much smaller population and a lower birth
rate.51 Part of this ideology was based on a theory that white men were only suited to
inhabit temperate regions. This led Roosevelt to applaud Australia and North
American “commonwealths [for] their democratic insistence on race purity,” which
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secured for the white race vast sections of the temperate zones surrounding the
Pacific.52
The anxiety that Pearson’s book engendered was also a factor in Roosevelt’s
turn towards jingoism in the 1890s. His growing penchant for militarism was
particularly represented in his response both to Japan’s victory in the 1905 RussoJapanese war and his response to the Pacific Coast race riots of 1907. According to
historian Erika Lee, white men’s countries around the Pacific Rim responded to
Japanese military prowess by embracing a cooperative and coordinated policy of
shoring up the “White Pacific.”53 In San Francisco in 1907, as an offshoot of previous
anti-Chinese campaigning, anti-Japanese groups took to the streets after being
emboldened by a school board order to segregate Japanese students.54 At one point a
mob turned violent, damaging a number of Japanese businesses. Similar riots occurred
that year in Bellingham, Washington and Vancouver, Canada.55
These events only served to heighten concerns in the United States, Canada,
and Australia about the “Asiatic issue.”56 The San Francisco Chronicle captured
popular sentiment of the time. It warned, “The brown stream of Japanese would
become a raging torrent.”57 In order to shore up perceptions of a “White Pacific,” in
the wake of Japan’s victory and popular protest against immigration, Roosevelt called
for a “unity of action.” He wanted all white men’s countries of the pacific slope to halt
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immigration from Asian countries to “the countries where the English-speaking
peoples now form and will form the population of the future.” 58 In 1907, Roosevelt
ordered a U.S. naval procession dubbed the “great white fleet” to tour the Pacific in
support of the effort.
Another result of San Francisco’s anti-Japanese agitation was a renewed
embrace of Asian exclusion by progressive politicians like William Jennings Bryan
and California Senator James D. Phelan. In an attempt to win the votes of Californians,
the Democratic Party added an anti-Japanese plank to its party platform. Phelan in
particular was known for his embrace of transnational yellow peril rhetoric.59 During
Bryan’s 1908 campaign for president, Phelan often tried to persuade voters that they
should vote for Bryan because “only the Great Commoner [Bryan] could prevent the
Pacific slope from being overrun by hordes of Japanese.”60
The California legislature crafted a number of anti-Japanese bills in 1909.
Among the measures introduced was a school segregation bill targeting Japanese
students and a bill barring Japanese nationals from land ownership designed to halt the
movement of Japanese from San Francisco to inland farming communities. Because
the school bill would directly contravene the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with Japan,
Roosevelt urged the Republican California governor to step in and veto all antiJapanese bills.

58

Lee, p. 554
Phelan had strong ties to the labor movement in San Francisco including to the Building Trades
Council’s Japanese and Korean Exclusion League. For instance, in 1900 during his term as mayor he
was a key speaker at the first convention among labor leaders to exclude Japanese immigrant workers
from the Pacific Coast. Alexander Saxton, The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese
Movement in California,(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 248.
60
Daniels, 47.
59

25
Californian plans to pass the Alien Land law were much more successful under
the Woodrow Wilson administration in 1913. In an exchange with Senator Phelan
during his presidential campaign provides an indication of Wilson’s unwillingness to
defend Japanese rights:
In the matter of Chinese and Japanese coolie immigration, I stand for the
national policy of exclusion. We cannot make a homogeneous population out
of a people who do not blend with the Caucasian race. Their lower standard of
living as laborers will crowd out the white agriculturist, and is in other fields, a
most serious industrial menace. The success of our free democratic institutions
demands of our people education, intelligence, and patriotism and the state
should protect them against unjust and impossible competition. Remunerative
labor is the basis of contentment. Democracy rests on the equality of the
citizen. Oriental coolieism will give us another race problem to solve and
surely we have had our lesson.61
Despite the diplomatic problems it would cause, Wilson would not stand in the way of
California’s Alien Land Law of 1913. He decided instead to go on the record
embracing the full gamut of anti-Asian rhetoric.
Walter M. Pierce: Champion of the Common (White) Man
Walter M. Pierce’s political stance also fit into the model of racially exclusive
progressivism, which illuminates the Oregon story of anti-Japanese agitation. Pierce
was a self-identified liberal democrat who got his start in politics as the school
superintendent of rural Umatilla County, Oregon in 1886. He then rose through the
state legislature to governor in 1922. From 1896 to 1902, Pierce was, at his core, a
racially exclusive progressive reformer. In 1880 and 1886 Pierce supported Sylvester
Pannier’s campaigns for governor because of his support for anti-corruption measures
and the exclusion of Chinese immigrants.
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From 1896 to 1902, Pierce also supported the measures known now as the
Oregon System, spearheaded by William S. Uren, designed to undermine the influence
of business in the Oregon state house.62 Inherent to this opposition movement was a
reaction to the power of large financial interests to buy off legislators and move public
resources into the hands of speculators. Pierce was concerned that such corruption
disenfranchised those of little means such as farmers. Pierce by this time also
supported Asian exclusion shown in his support for Sylvester Pennoyer’s campaigns
for Oregon governor in 1886 and 1880, which emphasized both reform and opposition
to the Chinese.63
After Pierce was elected governor in 1922, he immediately went to work trying
to alleviate the woes of white Oregon farmers, seeking to underline his image as the
people’s champion. Pierce sought a progressive taxation scheme that shifted property
tax burdens from farmers to urban landholders. He also sought to eliminate unAmerican (a popular euphemism for nonwhites at the time) influences on Oregon. A
key component of this push was a set of “Americanism bills” including a Californiastyle Alien Land Law.64 Bills seeking to bar alien land ownership had been introduced
into the Oregon legislature in both 1911 and 1917 at the behest of the American

62

Bone, 37.
McCoy, 407.
64
The California Alien Land Law was the product of a labor-progressive alliance in the California
legislature following the 1910 election. Saxton argues that the main product of this alliance was an
increased belligerence towards the Japanese, expressed through Alien Land Law. The law was easily
circumvented but laid an important precedent in legal language targeting Japanese Americans. See
Saxton, pp. 256-257.
63

27
Legion and the Grange, but had been tabled by request of the State Department due to
international negotiations.65
The arrival of the Oregon Ku Klux Klan onto the political scene in the early
1920s strengthened the cause of Japanese exclusion. The Klan in Oregon was a
product of the larger racially exclusive progressive movement, which was Anti-Asian,
opposed to financial corruption in state government, and was not confined to the
countryside.66 Japanese immigrants in Oregon were essentially caught up in the
conflict between middle class Oregonians and Portland business interests.
While Klan proponents advocated for “oriental exclusion,” the Oregon
Chamber of Commerce opposed the alien land bill because they believed that business
would move to Vancouver, British Columbia if the Japanese were no longer welcome
in Oregon. W. D. B. Dobson of the Portland Chamber of Commerce “acknowledged
that it was important to keep Oregon white and American,” but it was necessary for
economic recovery from the Post-World War I depression not to block the growth of
business.67 The Chamber of Commerce’s real concern here was the $69 million per
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year in trade with Japan. Farm groups and the American Legion favored the bill,
seeing the Japanese land ownership as a further threat.
Similar to the earlier Australian parliament’s borrowing from the California
model, the Oregon Alien Land Law of 1923 did not explicitly name Japanese
immigrants in the bill, but they were certainly the implied targets. In this sense,
drafters of the bill followed the model of California’s 1913 Alien Land Law. Roger
Daniels explains that the phrase “aliens ineligible for citizenship” is the key wording
used by California lawmakers to target Japanese immigrants. Because U.S.
naturalization law only allowed free whites to be citizens, and African American
citizenship had already been provided by the Fourteenth amendment, the only
significant racial category left was Asians.69 By 1922, the U. S. Supreme Court had
spoken on the issue of Japanese citizenship in Ozawa v. US, claiming that it did not
matter that Takao Ozawa had assimilated into American culture and had white skin; he
was not Caucasian and thus ineligible for citizenship.70 Although citizenship for Issei
would invalidate the Alien Land Laws, that avenue lay far out of reach.
Oregon Progressivism in the 1930s: The Oregon Commonwealth Federation
During the 1930s, progressives in Oregon continued to battle against business
interests in Oregon, shifting their focus away from Asian exclusion. Instead,
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progressives became consumed by attempts to ensure that the material benefits of the
abundant electricity produced by dams on the Columbia River went to average
ratepayers, rather than corporations. Oregon conservatives, like Democratic Governor
Charles H. Martin and the Portland Chamber of Commerce, instead believed that
projects like the Bonneville dam were designed to build up industries such as
aluminum production that required cheap and abundant energy.71
In the 1930s the progressives of Oregon aligned around New Deal policies
meant to renovate the middle class, forming the Oregon Commonwealth Federation
(OCF) in 1932. In practice the OCF included local unions, the Oregon State Grange,
and civil rights progressives in support of middle and working class issues. In one of
their pamphlets, the OCF justified its creation by saying:
For years the well-organized forces of greed and exploitation held sway. We
common people, numerically stronger, were helpless because we were
divided—and KEPT divided. The justice of our cause was no match for the
shrewdness and might of MONEY—at the polls, in the legislative halls, in
business.72
Each year in the spring and fall the OCF would gather together member organizations
to endorse political candidates and issue resolutions.
The key goal for progressives, racially exclusive progressives and civil rights
progressives alike, was to require public ownership of electricity distribution. They
felt that private utility companies overcharged for electricity and were uninterested in
providing rural service. For instance, in 1934, only thirty-one percent of Oregon farms
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had access to electricity because private utilities were largely uninterested in the
capital outlays required to spread service.73 This severely hampered the property
values of farmers and limited their operations, leading them to oppose the monied
interests prevalent in Oregon politics and stand shoulder-to-shoulder with labor groups
in the fight for public power under the Oregon Commonwealth Federation.
Pierce gained the support of the OCF because he had long been an advocate for
public power, calling for expanded service and cheaper electric rates. In a 1938 speech
he said: “Throughout my legislative career, I have recognized the principle of public
benefit, and have advocated the utilization of water power for the benefit of all
people.”74 During Pierce’s term as United States Congressman from 1932 to 1942, he
introduced a number of bills in support of fair distribution of power. One of his most
ambitious was HR 6387 in 1937, designed to require half of the electricity produced
by Columbia River dams to go to public utilities and cooperatives. The Franklin D.
Roosevelt administration supported the bill, but Governor Martin and Oregon business
interests denounced both Pierce and the bill, claiming it “smacked of socialism and
illegal regulation of private property by the government.”75 In this fight Pierce used
the traditional progressive rhetoric of creating a system that favored the average man
over the “interests” and was successful in passing the bill, which was the first step in
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creating a public regional power authority along the lines of the Tennessee Valley
Authority.76
The key Portland leaders of this grass-roots movement were lawyer Gus J.
Solomon and Monroe Sweetland, both notable for their social justice advocacy in the
postwar period. Solomon, a highly idealistic young Jewish attorney, was one of the
few attorneys in the business friendly Portland legal establishment willing to give up
other business to support the creation of rural cooperatives. In some cases he even lost
money. For instance, starting in 1935, Solomon represented the Northwest Public
Power Association for three years in their attempt to set up rural public utility districts
netting him only $840. This amount averaged about a dollars worth of pay for every
hour he worked for them when his office costs averaged three dollars an hour.77
Beginning in 1932, Solomon also began offering free legal advice to the Oregon State
Grange, leading journalist Richard Neuberger to dub him “Mr. Public Power.”
Business interests, meanwhile, smeared Solomon as a communist on the radio and in
the press.78 Sweetland, a young socialist and former student organizer, moved to
Portland for a job with the National Labor Relations Board in 1936.79 He was
considerably more radical than Solomon, advocating the “public ownership of all
natural resources, utilities, banks, and monopolies.”80
Sweetland had long been a member of the socialist party. But by 1938, like
many other socialist progressives, he had come to support Roosevelt’s New Deal
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policies after they came under attack by conservatives on the national level and
Governor Martin at home. For Sweetland and Solomon, participation in the OCF
allowed them political power to aid downtrodden white Oregonians, but they focused
little on aiding minorities like Japanese Americans because it would strain the OCF
alliance.
The OCF and other progressive groups faced a showdown in terms of public
power in 1940. Buoyed by heavy union backing, the OCF redoubled its efforts to
ensure public ownership. The OCF organized a series of ballot measure campaigns to
establish Public Utility Districts all over Oregon, making 1940 “the high-water mark
for public ownership.”81 Unfortunately, all of these measures were defeated by the
opposition campaigns headed up by the private utility companies. This resounding
defeat sounded a death knell for the public power argument. Though the PUD issue
remained in rural areas because of the preference clause in the Bonneville Power Act,
the public power argument was never a galvanizing force in Oregon progressive
politics again. Because, as Robert D. Johnston noted, progressive politics in Oregon
have always been “fragmented, fluid, and issue focused,”82 progressive groups began
to fray and lose political clout. Sweetland and Solomon’s avenue to political influence
had reached a dead end.
Solomon tried to remain active in progressive causes like the protection of civil
rights, but found little support from the broader community. As Harry H. Stein notes,
in these two years “Oregon’s liberal organizations shrank, functioned poorly, or
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disappeared, and no significant replacements appeared until a group was formed to aid
returning Japanese Americans in 1944.”83 Organizations like the Portland chapter of
the American Civil Liberties Union, for instance, had practically disappeared by 1942.
Portland was a place practically devoid of civil rights activism on the eve of World
War II.
Pearl Harbor as Opportunity
After Pearl Harbor, in an atmosphere of wartime hysteria, the Nikkei faced a
mounting challenge to their civil and economic rights by the Portland City Council.
December 7th was traumatic for all Nikkei in Oregon, but particularly the Issei.
Citizenship quickly became Japanese Americans’ only commodity in proclamations to
a Portland public long primed to defend white society from racial others. The run up to
the war sapped the strength of groups like the American Civil Liberties Union within
Oregon that had called for the fair treatment of ethnic minorities.
The lack of political leadership on the issue may not have been so catastrophic
if the Nikkei would have had a legitimate political voice with which to protest the
policy of internment. Eiichiro Azuma argued that following Pearl Harbor what
resulted was “an amalgamation of nationalism and racism which culminated in a
complete polarization between things Japanese and things American in each warring
state.”84 This meant the Nikkei bore a burden of proving their Americanism to the
larger public, who largely coded all Japanese as disloyal in racial terms. This
polarization especially marginalized the voices of the Issei. Because they were still
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citizens of Japan, when the Issei publicly professed their loyalty, the public coded it as
“unqualified Americanism” or pro-Japanese propaganda.85
Besides the challenge of an increasingly hostile public, the Issei also faced the
indignity of watching the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), an all-Nisei
patriotic organization, distance themselves politically from them in 1941. The Nisei
sought to prove their “Americaness” by espousing their support for the Roosevelt
administration’s policy of F.B.I sweeps. In a newspaper interview on December 7th,
former JACL president Howard Nomura seemed to disown his heritage saying, “at
best our position is not good—we look like Japanese and nothing can be done about it.”
They failed to defend the loyalty of their parents, choosing instead to report any
“suspicious activities of Japanese” to the F.B.I. in order to protect the second
generation’s reputation. They called for fair play saying, “We can only rely on the
fairness of Caucasian Americans to help us through. We’re hoping they will see our
status.”86
It must be noted that Portland JACL leaders viewed the Issei as a public
relations liability even before Pearl Harbor. In early 1941, the Portland JACL held a
series of town meetings where they debated problems of employment, conduct of
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various Portland Nisei groups, and increasing tensions between the “hakujin”(white)
community and the Japanese community. Nomura told assembled JACL members:
As you notice in the American paper, the JACL is coming out once in a while
with Nisei loyalty as to the United States. We are doing this primarily for one
purpose. You, as Japanese, regardless of whether you are Issei, Nisei, or Kibei,
are grouped as one race, and whatever the Issei do, the Nisei also will profit or
suffer. Now in the newspapers we are trying to say that second generation are
as loyal Americans as any other Caucasian race. Rumors have reached the
office that some first generation, probably under the influence of liquor, are
denouncing the United States; some Kibei have said that they would not bear
arms for the United States, but would bear arms for Japan.87
Nomura and other JACL leaders concluded the best chance of presenting Nisei as
loyal Americans was to distance themselves publicly from the Issei. JACL leaders
suggested that Nisei could prove their loyalty in a number of ways: Nisei with dual
citizenship could officially renounce their Japanese citizenship; individuals could also
cooperate with the FBI investigations that were gathering information on the various
Nikkei community organizations by informing on individuals espousing antiAmerican rhetoric. National JACL treasurer Hito Okada concurred claiming, “Loyalty
is something you can wear like a badge.”88 Conversely, JACL readily dismissed Nisei
uninterested in military or other public service due to their unequal social status in
America. When one Nisei asked if it did not make sense to repatriate to Japan to live
where they could be treated equally, Okada told him he did “not appreciate his
American citizenship” and told him he was welcome to repatriate.89
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Pearl Harbor provided a perfect opportunity for anti-Japanese progressives like
Pierce and the Oregon Grange to break ranks with civil rights minded progressives by
speaking out against the Japanese. Public officials in Portland used the occasion to
note what they saw as the inevitability of war with Japan. For instance, former mayor
and local commander of the American Legion Joseph K. Carson claimed in a
statement in the Oregonian: “we have known for some days that this action that has
occurred was almost certain to happen…this is an all out war against America, and
victory depends on the extent to which every citizen does his or her part.” Pierce
concurred saying, “I have always believed we would have to fight Japan ultimately. I
believe now that this attack on Honolulu and Guam will unify the nation like nothing
else possibly could have done.”90 Unity, for them, was to be built on the destiny of
conflict between the Japanese race and America.
The few voices that spoke up for the Nikkei before internment belonged to
church groups like the Portland Chapter of the Young Women’s Christian Association
(YWCA). The day after Pearl Harbor, Betty Britton, Mildred Bartholomew, and
Lazelle Alway of the YWCA sent Oregon governor Charles Sprague a letter praising
him for his statement that he believed in the loyalty of the Nisei to the United States.
They pledged aid to “these frightened young people” as they face a climate of palpable
anti-Japanese sentiment and the economic difficulties of having their parents swept up
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by FBI raids. According to Ellen Eisenberg, a key factor in the advocacy of church
91

and other groups was contact with the Nikkei community.92 The Nikkei had little
contact with the white community because they were ghettoized in two downtown
neighborhoods by groups like the Association of Oregon Apartment House Owners
who claimed the commingling of different races could only lead to trouble, and could
lower home values.93 The YWCA had formed a group called the girl reserves, which
included Nisei girls. This was one of the few contacts between the Nikkei and white
community before the war.
Soon after the Pearl Harbor incident, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
conducted raids that removed nearly every Issei community leader in Portland. The
FBI abducted all of the board members of the Oregon Japanese Association, religious
leaders like the reverend of the Japanese Methodist Church, and key Issei business
leaders like Masuo Yasui and Umata Matsuhsima. Fifty-nine Issei, out of about 300
families in Portland, were incarcerated due to varying levels of assumed disloyalty.94
The negative effects of such raids were particularly pronounced in Portland because
Portland had a high percentage of Issei within the overall Nikkei population, at 43.2
percent, greater than any other West Coast City.95
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Arrests by the FBI spread quickly from 17 Issei on December 7 in Portland,
th

to 3,849 alien enemies in the United States overall by February 16, 1942.96 2,192 of
these were Issei, 1,266 of which were from the West Coast. These arrests clearly
targeted Japanese above other groups with much larger total populations in the United
States, such as Germans with 1,393 total arrests and Italians with only 264 arrests
nationwide. 97 In the end, the FBI arrested 59 Issei from Oregon.98 The only slightly
mitigating factor in the F.B.I. sweeps was the fact that U.S. Attorney General Francis
Biddle ordered local law enforcement groups to leave the detention of “enemy aliens”
to the F.B.I. preventing the spread of what he called in a 1940 speech the
transformation of the local cop into the “petty tyrant.”99
Theft as Official Portland City Council Policy
Although the general air of anti-Japanese sentiment in Portland following Pearl
Harbor was not unique among West Coast cities, actions by the Portland City Council
were. While the Portland Police may have been under orders to play only a supporting
role in persecution of the Issei, the Portland City Council felt more action against the
Japanese was necessary. On 2 January1942, Portland Chief License Inspector Joe
Hutchinson brought up the issue of what to do with the liquor license applications
submitted by Issei. He was inclined to reject the licenses of all applicants that listed
Japan as their birthplace. He first asked the F.B.I., who declined to comment on the
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issue, so Hutchison declined to accept any more Issei applications. Hutchison also
forced Nisei applicants like George I. Azumano to walk down to the police bureau to
be fingerprinted before receiving their license, despite the fact that they had all already
passed a criminal background check.100
Mayor Earl Riley, who was closely allied with Portland business interests,
welcomed the chance to go on the record in opposition to the Japanese: “Let us find
out what the policy of the council is to be right now. Let us not confuse Japanese with
other aliens.” Councilman Fred Peterson responded, “they are on the same basis as the
Germans and Italians right now.”101 According to a message from U.S. Attorney
General Biddle, legally they were. Under the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940,
all groups should have been treated the same.102 Also, as Chief Deputy City Attorney
Alexander Brown reminded the councilmen, the Department of Justice had already
gone on record stating Japanese nationals should not be denied business licenses.103
Riley and his allies on the council were not daunted by such restrictions. He
claimed the Japanese were different from Germans and Italians because they were not
eligible for citizenship. He considered Issei alone to be alien enemies. Commissioner
William Bowes concurred, proposing a motion to revoke all of the licenses belonging
to Issei on the grounds that being from Japan they were still “more or less loyal” to
Japan and likely to be recruited as spies. Riley’s testimony that night described the
Issei’s marginalized position as an opportunity:
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What does the council want to do? What is the reaction of our people? I see
some of them have changed their names. The goods are bought and paid for
and they use American names. If not sold and used it [the goods in Japanese
stores] is going to require other American money to pay for it. It is wasted.
That is the attitude of the government. If we refuse to license any of them, I am
speaking of the Japanese only now, and the merchandise has been freed by the
government, they will have to dispose of them at sacrifice, which doesn’t mean
anything as far as the government or the City is concerned, to somebody that
can sell it at an American store, if they can sell it.104
What Riley’s suggestion amounted to was the robbing of Portland Issei, so that their
merchandise could benefit white, American businessmen. Riley was not only drawing
a line of naturalization that excluded Issei from civil rights, but also from access to
economic resources that he saw as rightfully belonging to white Americans.
According to estimates based on a postwar survey by the Portland JACL, the average
Oregon Nikkei family lost $9361 (about $124,000 in 2010 dollars) due to their
incarceration.105 In the end, the Portland City Council revoked the business licenses of
54 Issei businessmen.106
The press also legitimized calls for Japanese exclusion in 1942. However, the
degree to which anti-Japanese hysteria was a product of a campaign by the press to
demonize the Japanese, or an organic outgrowth, is unclear. According to War
Relocation Authority reports, towards the end of January 1942 a convention of
California newspapers met and determined that they would stand together to call for
the exclusion of the Japanese from the West Coast. This decision also swayed key
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Portland newspapermen like Oregon Journal editor Marshall Dana to advocate for
exclusion and speak publicly in favor of internment.107
The increased public outcry led Biddle on 29 January 1942 to call for the
evacuation of the Japanese from industrial areas on the West Coast thought of as
vulnerable to sabotage.108 His public statement and a flood of correspondence from
groups like the American Legion and the Grange led the West Coast Congressional
delegation, including Pierce, to meet on 2 February in the office of California Senator
Hiram Johnson, a long-time leader in the California progressive movement, to
formulate a plan of action regarding the Japanese living on the West Coast.109 On 13
February 1942, the impromptu commission issued a statement to President Roosevelt
calling for the following:
The immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage and all others,
aliens and citizens alike whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or inimical
to the defense of the United States…we make these recommendations in order
that no citizen, located in a strategic area, may cloak his disloyal or subversive
activity under the mantle of his citizenship alone.110
Individual members of the commission, like Pierce, had long been opposed to the
Japanese, but this statement signaled a new level of belligerence.
A series of congratulatory letters between West Coast congressmen suggests
that their anti-Japanese sentiment needed little reinforcement by constituents. On
February 14th, Pierce wrote Republican Congressman Homer D. Angell to
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congratulate him on the stand he took against the Nisei during the commission’s
deliberations. In response, Angell thanked him and again urged the importance of
internment to prevent “a repetition of Pearl Harbor…we cannot stand on ceremony
and allow Japs professing to be citizens and maintaining dual citizenship to hide
behind our Constitution and stab us in the back while we sit idly by twiddling our
thumbs.”111 These letters signal an alliance based on wartime concerns and antiJapanese sentiment, or as Azuma termed the sentiment, “super-American nationalism”
that functioned in tandem with racism.112 This alliance conspicuously excluded civil
rights minded progressives of the OCF, such as Solomon.
The West Coast congressmen’s statement urging internment signaled an
official turn of the U.S. legislative branch against the Nikkei. Roosevelt must have
found this message persuasive because he signed Executive Order 9066 calling for the
internment of all Nikkei six days later, on February 19th. This also happened to be the
same day the Portland City Council passed a resolution calling for removal of the
Nikkei “irrespective of their citizenship…for the duration of the war,” a stand that
Pierce praised.113 In terms of Azuma’s division between all things American and
Japanese, the Nikkei were in the judgment of all three branches of the federal
government marginalized as one-dimensionally Japanese: a dangerous, disloyal group
in need of exclusion.
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Before Army officials implemented internment orders in May 1942, the
growing consensus for Japanese exclusion in wartime caused trepidation amongst
groups sympathetic towards Japanese Americans. The effect of political pressure for
exclusion in Portland was evident in the statements of Governor Charles Sprague and
testimony at the Tolan Committee hearings. Sprague, like Sweetland and Solomon, is
notable for his relative silence on Nikkei civil rights until after internment.114 In
response to a letter from Portland high school teacher Clarence E. Oliver who called
for the protection of the Nikkei, Sprague claimed he saw the Issei mainly as farmers
interested in continuing work and the Nisei of the JACL had sent expressions of
loyalty he found to be sincere.115 Also, in a letter to Mike Masaoka, the national
director of the JACL on 19 January 1942, Sprague vowed “to do my utmost to protect
loyal Japanese Americans from molestation.”116
Other correspondence indicates that Sprague was not, however, willing to
translate his friendliness towards the Nikkei into condemnation of anti-Japanese
rhetoric. For instance, on January 19th, in response to a letter from Anna M. Hunsaker
calling for the complete removal of all Japanese from America, written the day before
Pearl Harbor, he claimed it would be against the Constitution to interfere with
Japanese Americans, but called for alertness for acts of disloyalty.117
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Sprague failed, furthermore, to condemn Hunsaker for her overt racist rhetoric
or proclaim the loyalty of the Nisei as he did in letters to individuals friendly to the
Japanese. By mid February, due to increased anti-Japanese sentiment in
correspondence to him and in the press, and the anti-Japanese political action of the
Coast Congressional Delegation, Sprague felt it necessary to write a telegram to U.S.
Attorney General Biddle:
I am convinced that our people on this coast demand more thorough action for
protection against possible alien activity particularly by Japanese residing on
coast. I do not believe measures now being taken are adequate and urge further
and prompt action to remove this menace and recommend internment. We
want no repetition of the Honolulu experience here. Recommend your agents
confer with military and police authorities to plan positive protection for
Americans, with decent treatment of Japanese.”118
The statement was also published in the Oregonian.119 One reason for
Sprague’s statement was a new challenge to his re-election by conservative
Republican Earl Snell. Reading the political winds, Sprague chose not to advocate for
the Nikkei civil rights question in his second gubernatorial campaign, a choice he
would later come to deeply regret.120
Following Executive Order 9066, Roosevelt charged a U. S. House committee
investigating migration caused by war industries, with polling West Coast
communities before the internment order went into effect. Congressman John H. Tolan
headed the committee; the hearings beginning on 21 February in San Francisco and
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arriving in Portland on 26 February were generally referred to as the Tolan
hearings.121 The Tolan Committee hearings served legitimize of Executive Order 9066.
While the Committee called for decent treatment of the Japanese and protection of
their property, Tolan claimed, “This is secondary to the safety of the nation.”122
Although elsewhere the Tolan Committee supported progressive issues such as labor
rights, the committee did not consider the civil rights of Japanese important enough to
interfere with national security efforts.
Leaders in the 1945 debate over the return of Japanese Americans were
notably absent at the Portland Tolan hearing. McKay notes that the Tolan hearings in
Portland would have been an ideal venue for Sprague to come out in support of
Japanese Americans as he eventually did strongly in 1944.123 For Pierce, it could have
been an ideal venue for him to espouse his call for Japanese exclusion, a cause he was
avidly involved in by 1944. He was in Oregon at the time, but according to his wife
Cornelia, it was because his only son had died.124 Solomon was one of the few
Portland leaders of the defunct OCF who wanted to stand up for Japanese Americans.
His problem was a lack of allies. Solomon spoke out at a Portland meeting of the
American Jewish Congress with the argument that Jews would be next if they did not
speak out against the internment of the Japanese Americans, but he found no support
because his Jewish audience did not want to appear unpatriotic.125
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The only figure to speak out publicly against the policy of internment of the
Nikkei was a former missionary to Japan, Azalea Emma Peet, daughter of Portland’s
infamous purity crusader Lola Baldwin. She spoke not as a representative of any
particular organization, but as an individual.126 She claimed the Nikkei were law
abiding and upstanding members of the community, making no distinctions between
Japanese with or without citizenship. Because of her extensive contact with Nikkei,
she was willing to stand alone in opposition to Roosevelt administration policy, antiJapanese progressives such as Pierce and the Oregon Grange, Portland businessmen
leaders, the Portland City Council, the governor, and patriotic groups like the
American Legion.
The Tolan Hearings were a missed opportunity for civil rights progressives
Sweetland and Solomon, YWCA leaders, and Sprague to protest Nikkei incarceration.
Japanese American testimony was severely marginalized, leaving them with little
power to protest their internment in the face of prevalent racial nationalism. The
public power issue in the prewar progressive alliance is key to understanding why, as
Eisenberg notes, only an unaffiliated missionary stood up for Portland Nikkei. In the
1930s two strands of progressives--racially exclusive progressives, such as Pierce,
representing the old guard and civil rights progressives, such as Sweetland and
Solomon, representing the new guard--with widely divergent views on civil rights for
the Nikkei, came together in the Oregon Commonwealth Federation to fight for the
public distribution of electricity and Roosevelt’s New Deal policies. OCF progressives
such as Sweetland and Solomon served as organizers of a progressive block of voters
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until a series of ballot measure defeats in 1940 spelled the end of the statewide public
power movement in Oregon. Without the driving force of public power, progressive
groups largely went dormant or extinct by 1942.
After Pearl Harbor, due to both public hysteria and his long-term anti-Japanese
agenda, Pierce broke ranks with civil rights progressives. He joined with the West
Coast congressional delegation in recommending internment of all West Coast Nikkei
for the duration of the war. Roosevelt then gave racial exclusion his stamp of approval
on 19 February 1942 when he published executive order 9066. Internment in one
sense was a heightening of the persecution of Issei as alien enemies by the F.B.I at the
behest of Roosevelt’s attorney general Francis Biddle. The role of alien enemies had
been under serious debate in U.S. Congress since at least 1938, and the frame for the
debate had long been the accepted difference between citizens and non-citizens. This
division was key because it affected the views of even pro-Nikkei leaders like Sprague,
who acquiesced to federal authorities who targeted the Issei above other alien groups,
but spoke to the loyalty of the Nisei until internment seemed inevitable. The
designation of alien enemy also allowed the Portland City Council to single out the
Issei when Mayor Riley called for revoking Issei business licenses.
By the February 1942 Tolan hearings in Portland, Roosevelt administration
policy largely aligned with calls from racially exclusive progressives like Pierce and
the Oregon Grange. Due both to a lack of institutional support and palpable antiJapanese sentiment in Oregon, potential advocates for Nikkei constitutional rights
were marginalized. Solomon, a key supporter of the Japanese by 1944, found no allies
in his calls for prevention of internment. The lack of progressive civil rights advocacy
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for the Nikkei due to the absence of the organizing force of the public power debate
was a main reason why no groups and only Peet spoke out against internment in
Portland.
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Chapter 3: “Despite Race, Color, or Creed”

On 9 January 1944, more than eight months before the end of the Pacific War,
Ted Hachiya was one of the first Japanese Americans to return to Portland. For
Hachiya, coming back to his family business, a hotel in downtown Portland, involved
more than a reevaluation of accounts and tenants. Returning to Portland meant
renegotiating an identity acceptable to the majority white community. The Japanese
community had vanished from Portland in 1942 and it was not certain if their return,
in practice, would be allowed, despite U.S. Supreme Court and Army decisions in
December to bring internment to a close.127
Not long after his return, Hachiya spoke to a reporter from the local newspaper,
the Oregonian. Hachiya said the return of Japanese Americans to the West Coast
would be difficult, especially for those without homes or businesses to which to return.
However, he largely portrayed relocation in a positive light. He claimed that wartime
relocation programs had been beneficial to the Nisei because the “opportunity” had
offered training in new trades and a chance to travel around the United States.
Continuing with his affirmative story of the Japanese American incarceration, Hachiya
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shared an anecdote about his return to Portland that reflects Nisei strategies for
acceptance during the return period.
On the way to Portland on a bus I met several servicemen…I told them I was
an American-born Japanese and they were most friendly with me. At one small
town between Pendleton and Hood River, a soldier and I got out when the bus
stopped and a fellow came up to me [sic] if I was a Jap. I told him I was an
American of Japanese ancestry. The soldier took my side and asked the fellow
what difference it made. The soldier said I was an American just the same as
he was.128
Hachiya used the testimony of American soldiers to legitimize his claim to fullfledged American citizenship. For Hachiya, and other returning Japanese Americans,
association with the Army, in large part through the story of the Nisei 442nd
Regimental Army Combat Team, became a gateway to establishing acceptance within
the larger community.
In the return period, Japanese Americans embraced the Nisei patriotism
argument because Portland had changed in their absence. During the war, class
politics between progressives and business interests gave way to a fierce public debate
over the boundaries of American citizenship. More specifically, two alignments
emerged in wartime Portland over whether to aid returning Japanese Americans, or to
exclude them entirely. These two groups correspond ideologically to Gary Gerstle’s
conception of racial versus civic nationalism. Gerstle argued that American history
during the twentieth century was defined by a conflict between civic nationalism,
defined as democratic universalism embracing rights of equality and liberty despite
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heritage, and a racial nationalism that saw Americans as “held together by common
blood and skin color and by an inherent fitness for self-government.”129
During World War II, racially exclusive progressives, like Congressman
Walter M. Pierce, turned away from issues of class conflict in order to create a broader
coalition supporting Japanese exclusion, fronted publicly by the American Legion and
the Japanese Exclusion League. These anti-Japanese groups embraced a racial
definition of citizenship that excluded Japanese Americans and attempted to publicly
brand Japanese Americans as a racial, financial, and physical danger to the United
States. When compared to the earlier racially exclusive progressivism, Japanese
exclusion during World War II was no longer legitimized by attempts to improve the
status of working class white Americans, but rather by the need to exclude Japanese
understood as a racially monolithic group who were inherently subversive to the
American way of life.
By 1943, however, prominent civic leaders, church councils, and news editors
in Portland began to abandon their silence because of increasing anti-Japanese rhetoric,
congressional memorials, and threats of violence. The choice by the YWCA, the
Portland Council of Churches, and other civic leaders to protest anti-Japanese Oregon
House memorials 8 and 9 in 1943, vandalism of the Japanese Cemetery in Portland,
and attempts by the Hood River American Legion to brand Nisei soldiers as unAmerican in 1944, caused a resurgence of civic nationalism in Portland that lasted
well into the postwar period. By 1945, this pro-Japanese alignment, a loose coalition
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of civic nationalists, formed the Portland Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation,
which worked in tandem with War Relocation Authority (WRA) to quell anti-Japanese
activism in Portland and the surrounding areas. They were successful because they
echoed the press’ embrace of the Nisei Patriotism argument, which juxtaposed Nisei
sacrifices to save white American soldiers in Europe with the reactionary racist antiJapanese organizers of the American Legion.
Therefore, returnees sought the aid of church groups, friendly newspapermen
and lawyers, and civilian and military government officials to counteract anti-Japanese
organizing efforts, rather than initiating public confrontations about the
unconstitutionality of their wartime incarceration as a method of reestablishing their
civil rights. These groups, referred to by Japanese American Citizens League (JACL)
members as “white angels,” were instrumental in easing Japanese Americans’
transition back to Portland.130 At times, alliances with these groups involved the
deliberate avoidance of more confrontational campaigns for civil rights. In 1945 war
tensions were still high and Japanese Americans had yet to return to Portland in large
numbers.131 Japanese American returnees saw a relatively smooth transition in
Portland, compared to anti-Japanese intimidation in Hood River, Oregon, because
Portland-based church groups won early battles in the arena of public opinion,
establishing public perception of Nisei as loyal Americans.
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Anti-Japanese Organizing by the American Legion
The larger Oregon American Legion organization played a key role in efforts
to permanently exclude the Nikkei from Oregon. In the press and through lobbying the
Oregon Legislature, the American Legion pursued its ideal of aiding “one hundred
percent Americans” at the expense of Japanese Americans Former Portland Mayor
Joseph K. Carson Jr. was a chief advocate for the American Legion in Portland.
Before the internment of Japanese Americans in May of 1942, Carson spoke before
Portland City Council and at the Tolan Committee Hearings in his capacity as
Commander of the Oregon Department of the American Legion to call for the removal
of all Japanese inland past the Cascade Mountains.132
Within the Legion itself, Carson led a campaign amongst other Oregon
American Legion leaders to pass resolutions to the U. S Congress proposing the
internment of the Nikkei until the end of the war with Japan due to the presence of
enemy alien Issei in their community. He gave three reasons for this: internment
would make sabotage against the war effort impossible; innocent Japanese would be
shielded from vigilante violence; and, if such violence were to happen, it could “be
used as a basis for reprisals against our unfortunate nationals who are in the hands of
the Japanese.”133 This stance on the Japanese, treating them as a racially monolithic
group, was not unique, but his lobbying of other posts in Oregon was key to uniting
the Oregon Department behind the banner of Japanese exclusion.
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Carson’s successor, Hugh Bowman, took an even harder line on the issue of
the return of the Japanese Americans to Oregon. Speaking at an Oregon Department
convention in Portland in 1943, Bowman unequivocally stated his support of
removing the Nikkei permanently. He said, “If I were to have my way, all Japs, native
born or otherwise, would be disposed of entirely in the quickest way possible. It must
be proven to me that there is such a thing as a Jap who is loyal to this country.”134 His
remarks also profoundly racialized of Japanese Americans. For instance, he attributed
the birth of the Nisei in America as a plot:
It is my studied opinion that any Jap who was or is native born, was so born for
but one reason; to be able to own property for the benefit of the citizens of his
or her fatherland and in the end for the final benefit of that fatherland when the
showdown which was bound to come, finally did come.135
Bowman subscribed to the idea that one’s race and sense of nation were both linked
and immovable. To him the Japanese, at home and abroad, would stop at nothing to
aid their racial brothers in the Japanese Imperial Army.
Under Bowman’s leadership, the Oregon Department of the American Legion
pursued a legislative and ideological agenda dedicated to a postwar Oregon free of the
Nikkei. At its 1943 convention, the Oregon department passed four resolutions
introduced by their Americanization committee.136 These called for the deportation of
“all persons of Japanese ancestry,” for the U.S. Congress to limit citizenship to those
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born to U.S. citizen parents, to revoke the citizenship of Japanese Americans because
they carried dual citizenship with Japan, and to support any groups that further these
aims. These resolutions were designed to prevent what they saw as “further insidious
infiltration, through accident of birth, of a race whose purpose is to possess, dominate,
and destroy.”137
The Legion’s anti-Japanese agenda was particularly powerful in the Oregon
State Legislature thanks to the efforts of the Legion’s Judge Advocate and Oregon
State Senator from Portland, Thomas R. Mahoney. Mahoney had long represented
Oregon Legionnaires in cases to secure preferential fishing rights on the Columbia for
American citizens as opposed to foreign nationals like the Issei.138 In the 1942 debate
over revoking Issei business licenses in Portland, Mahoney supported the City
Council’s decision because he believed Portlanders should be able to shop without
worrying they could be “contributing to the coffers of enemy aliens.” Furthermore, he
was an outspoken proponent of putting all of Portland’s Issei “behind barbed wire,”
following the Pearl Harbor incident.139
In 1943, Mahoney brought the American Legion resolutions to the Oregon
Legislature through a pair of controversial memorials, Senate Joint Memorials 8 and 9.
According to the Oregon Voter, No. 8 was a memorial petitioning the U.S. Congress
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to rescind orders allowing “American-born Japs” to serve in the military. No. 9 was a
memorial calling on the U. S. Congress to cancel the citizenship of all people of
Japanese ancestry and deport them immediately after the war.140
Reaction by state senators to these memorials is a telling indicator of the high
level of anti-Japanese sentiment in the Oregon legislature in 1943, but also reflects
their cautiousness at questioning military authority. Both memorials passed votes to be
considered in the legislature, but Oregon senators found the military service memorial,
passed 16-14, more controversial than the deportation memorial, passed 21-9.141 Some
senators argued that the military was fully capable of determining whether or not Nisei
were loyal enough to serve. Fewer senators had qualms with answering the Japanese
question with deportation.
Compared to representatives of other West Coast states, the Oregon
Legislature was both more opposed to the return of Japanese Americans and more
willing to question the wisdom of military orders. According to a Gallup pole of the
coastal states, while only 31% of respondents opposed the return of Japanese
Americans, 97% of respondents approved of the Army’s actions so far in reference to
internment.142 Much to Mahoney’s dismay, both measures later died in committee.143
Heeding these results, Mahoney pursued anti-Japanese organizing from 1943 on with
a much lower public profile.
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Ideologically, Mahoney and Pierce were close allies. One of Pierce’s final acts
in Congress was a profoundly anti-Japanese diatribe given in November 1942 titled
“Civilization Must Win Another Contest: The Japanese Onslaught.” In this speech,
Pierce portrayed all Japanese through the “yellow peril” rhetoric, depicting the
aggression of the Japanese as a threat to Western civilization similar to the threats of
Hannibal’s armies to Rome and Genghis Kahn’s horde of marauders to Europe.144 He
described the Japanese as “highly trained savage killers” uninterested in peace, whose
untrustworthiness was finally proved by the “stab” of Pearl Harbor.145 Pierce
recognized no difference between the Japanese on the Eastern and Western sides of
the Pacific. He described the immigration of the Issei to America as an “invasion”
representing a clear threat because of an imagined high Japanese birthrate compared to
Caucasians. He said of the Nikkei, “They multiply so much more rapidly and ask so
little of life...one way or another they have forced themselves into North America.
They believe that the [sic] world control will ultimately pass into the hands of the
yellow races, with Japan leading and making the terms.”146 Pierce’s answer to this
perceived threat was the deportation of all Japanese following the war.
In February of 1943, Pierce came home and began to give similar speeches all
over Oregon, including a speech on 15 May to the Progressive Business Men’s Club, a
key business association in Portland.147 Following Pearl Harbor, the Portland Business
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Men’s Club had been one of the few civic business groups in Portland to pass
resolutions calling for internment.148 Pierce spoke before the Club in 1943 in the hopes
that the influential business group would continue their opposition to the presence of
Japanese Americans in Oregon, which they by means of resolution in June.149 Pierce’s
appearance at the meeting is an indication that his anti-Japanese sentiment was strong
enough for him to put aside his anti-corporate views. Pierce consistently framed his
politics around anti-corporate populist rhetoric of the “people” versus the
“monopolies,” and his appearance showed his desire to form a broader alliance for
Japanese exclusion.150 Furthermore, his appearance demonstrated the great effect warinspired hatred of the Japanese and the American Legion’s anti-Japanese organizing
had on Portland businessmen.
This anti-Japanese victory was tainted, however, by the first significant public
challenge to anti-Japanese efforts in Portland. E. B MacNaughton, president of First
National Bank and later good friend to the Nikkei community, took this opportunity to
protest “racial scapegoating” by the club, though he was unsuccessful in preventing
the anti-Japanese resolution.151
The Portland Chamber of Commerce, on the other hand, needed little
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Chamber’s executive council sent out questionnaires to other Chambers of Commerce
and American Legion posts on the Pacific Coast to make sure Portland’s Chamber
came out on the right side of the issue of Japanese return. On 3 June, the executive
committee learned “it was pretty much the consensus that Japanese should not be
allowed to return to this area.”152 Following suit, the executive council voted to adopt
the same position. This signaled a departure from the Chamber’s previous proJapanese stance.153 The Chamber’s embrace of Japanese exclusion showed the
influence of anti-Japanese rhetoric and organizing, but was not a reflection of the
development of a growing, more general anti-Asian prejudice in Portland business
circles. Only a month later the executive council voted to support the addition of
Chinese people to the 1924 Johnson-Reed act’s naturalization quota system that had
previously barred them from citizenship.154
Desecration and Conflict in the Portland Japanese Cemetery
Although the American Legion in 1943 sought permanent exclusion of the
Nikkei mainly through lobbying efforts, on at least one occasion they also resorted to
threats of violence. Sometime during the summer of 1943, vandals tipped over or
destroyed about 250 grave markers in the Rose City Japanese Cemetery, then set the

152

“Minutes: Executive Committee,” Portland Chamber of Commerce, June 3, 1943, Mss 686-2, Folder
6, Oregon Historical Society Research Library.
153
The Portland Chamber of Commerce had almost always opposed anti-Japanese bills, such as the
Oregon Alien Land Law of 1923 because they believed they would give Portland a bad name in Japan,
thus the $69 million per year trade with Japan. Furthermore, a drop in trade would have also led to
friction with the Sailor’s Union of the Pacific, who often became restive in times of low trade and called
for the exclusion of Asian sailors from American vessels. This meant that a time of low trade would
also mean paying higher wages to American sailors. See Bone, p. 95. Also, “Sailor’s Union of the
Pacific, Japanese and Korean Exclusion League,” Minutes, 10 January 1910, Microfilm 59, Oregon
Historical Society Research Library.
154
“Minutes: Executive Committee,” 15 July 1943, p. 2.

155

cemetery on fire.
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On 14 August 1943, the Oregonian published an article

publicizing an effort led by Reverend J. W. Reed, president of a pacifist group called
the Portland Fellowship of Reconciliation, to repair damage to the cemetery, perform
bonmatsuri rites, and have a pot luck at the site to discuss Portland’s racial problem
the following day. In the article, Reed asked Portlanders for help in cleaning up the
cemetery as a way of showing their solidarity with Japanese Americans. Reed
conceived of the event after receiving $30 from Japanese Americans in Minidoka for
the purpose of buying wreaths to be placed on their families’ graves.156
On Saturday, Reed and others went to the cemetery and found the entrance
blocked by a contingent of Legionnaires, Sheriff Martin T. Pratt, and Multnomah
County District Attorney James R. Bain, who came together to stop the pacifist group
because they considered it “an insult to American war dead.” When Pratt threatened to
arrest the pacifist group claiming fear of a riot, Reed called off the program for
Sunday.157 The secretary for the national YMCA, Howard Willits, and other members
of the Portland religious community returned the next day despite warnings from
Sheriff Pratt.158 The police presence on Sunday escalated to twenty officers, local
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American Legion post commanders, and Portland city Commissioner Fred L. Peterson.
Pratt himself opted not to show claiming that the Japanese cemetery was officially
closed for the duration of the war.159 One source suggests that the Legionnaires
themselves were armed, but the Oregonian does not mention this.160 However, the
article mentions law enforcement on hand were friendly to the Legionnaires, making
no attempt to stop their heckling.161 Willits managed to barge his way in, but once
more Fellowship members showed up, heated arguments escalated to shoving and
threats of bloodshed.
The deputy on the scene attempted to diffuse the situation by reiterating Pratt’s
ban, after which Willits demanded to speak to him. Because the deputy would not
allow him to use the police radio, Willits was forced to seek a telephone elsewhere. A
farcical scene ensued, with hecklers following Willits for ten blocks to prevent him
from using phones in nearby businesses.162 Willits and others were ultimately unable
to repair the damage to the cemetery or prevent further desecration of the cemetery by
vandals in August 1944.163 The incident ended without violence or arrest, but served
as a serious point of friction between Portland religious groups and the anti-Japanese,
American Legion-aligned Portland leadership. This friction was surely heightened by
a speech given the following week by American Legion National Commander Roane
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Waring calling for the complete annihilation of the Japanese, a call that did not make a
special exception for Japanese Americans.164
The Coalition Against Anti-Return Groups
No Portland religious, business, or academic group staged significant
opposition to Nikkei incarceration in 1942. In 1943, Portland religious groups, such as
the Council of Churches and the YWCA, were the first to fill that void publicly in a
way that could provide real benefits for Japanese Americans. Through a series of
public statements in response to anti-Japanese organizing, members of the Portland
community inclined to support Japanese Americans’ right to return began to organize,
beginning with the previously mentioned Portland cemetery incident.
The Portland chapter of the YWCA was perhaps the first to address publicly
the injustice of internment. In early May 1943, Ruth W. Kingman of Berkeley,
California, spoke to a group of civic leaders at the YWCA in the hopes of forming a
Portland chapter of the Committee on American Principles and Fair Play. Kingman
did not call for the release of Japanese Americans, but rather sought to influence
public opinion on “the Japanese problem.” Whereas anti-Japanese groups saw the
“Japanese problem” as the threat people of Japanese descent posed to the livelihood of
the white majority, the Fair Play Committee viewed anti-Japanese legislative
campaigns as the true “Japanese problem.” Kingman claimed:
Legislation to deprive Americans of Japanese descent of any of their legal
rights would set a precedent for depriving other racial groups of their rights
and would weaken the confidence of our allies, particularly those in Asia and
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Latin America, in the sincerity of our professions to be fighting for the rights
of all people.165
In short, Kingman was the first to state openly in Portland’s press that the
incarceration of Japanese Americans undermined American principles and the war
effort.
It must be mentioned here that the Portland YWCA’s efforts on behalf of
Japanese Americans began well before World War II. As historian Mary K. Gayne
observed, the Portland YWCA had several Japanese American groups, such as the
Japanese Girl’s Reserves. These groups were meant to instill Christian values and to
integrate Japanese women into larger society as part of “efforts to achieve the
interracial goals set by the national YWCA in 1919.”166 Mildred Bartholomew,
Department of Religion and Membership Secretary, and Betty Britton, Secretary of the
Young Women’s Department supervised these efforts in Portland. In 1942, they
continued their work during the incarceration period by establishing the clubs in the
Minidoka internment camp,167 as well as by aiding Nikkei families through the storage
of some of their personal possessions.168 Barholomew visited Minidoka in October
1942 to meet with War Relocation Officials and JACL leaders, under the auspices of
visiting members of the Girls Reserve.169
Despite a long-term commitment to Japanese Americans, the Portland YWCA
refrained from taking a public stance against anti-Japanese campaigning by Pierce and
165

“Racial Bias To Be Fought,” Oregonian, 9 May 1943, Section 3, p 8.
Mary K. Gayne. “Japanese Americans at the Portland YWCA,” Journal of Women’s History 15, No
3, 197-198.
167
Minutes: Board of Director’s Meeting, Young Women’s Christian Association, Portland, OR, May
12, 1942, p 2. Box 9A, Folder 1, Lewis & Clark College Special Collections and Archives.
168
Gayne, 199.
169
“Portlanders Here for Y-Tea,” Minidoka Irrigator, 10 October 1942, 3.
166

64
the American Legion. Minutes from the YWCA Board of Directors show the board
was deeply concerned about Mahoney’s anti-Japanese memorials in March of 1943. In
response, the board chose to issue a resolution in opposition to these memorials. The
resolution was sent to other YWCA branches, but not to the Portland press.170 Other
Portland church groups were much more vocal in the press. The Portland Council of
Churches, the Oregon Christian Youth Council, the Oregon Council of Women, and
the Portland Chapter of the International League for Peace and Freedom publicly
claimed the Nisei were a “truly American” group because of their “hard work, thrift,
purchase of land and education.”171 While the precise reason for the YWCA’s restraint
is unclear, it seems likely that the board was reluctant to speak because they were
waiting for word from the national organization.
National YWCA representatives wished to remain neutral on the issue in the
interest of preserving their relationship with the War Relocation Authority (WRA), the
wartime agency within the Department of the Interior that supervised the internment
camps. The YWCA was one of the few groups allowed to operate in the WRA camps
along with the Red Cross, the USO, and handful of others.172 In the press, the YWCA
maintained a low profile so as not to give fuel to American Legion calls to return the
camps to Army control, which both groups believed would have dealt more harshly
170
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with Japanese Americans. Thus any organization aiding Japanese Americans in the
camps had to mute its advocacy in the press.
There is also evidence that the YWCA’s diplomatic approach was strategic in
that it allowed them to seek favors for certain Nisei. For instance, two weeks after
Bartholemew’s visit to Minidoka in October 1942, Frances Maeda became one of the
first two internees to be released for employment outside of the exclusion zone.173
Maeda had served under Bartholomew’s committee at the YWCA in a vital role as
liaison with the Japanese Methodist Church.174 Such favoritism was more the
exception than the rule because such releases engendered significant resentment on the
part of Nisei eager to seek opportunities in business and education outside of the
internment camps.175
By avoiding controversy, the National YWCA was able to seek a broader
effort to aid Nisei through the creation of a committee of West Coast college
presidents, educators, students, and clergy to arrange transfers to colleges in the East
in March and April of 1943. In May 1942, the program of school relocation run by the
National Japanese American Student Relocation Council became the first program
designed to mitigate the effects of internment on the Nisei.176 The program found
colleges willing to accept Nisei students and helped support their studies financially.
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Other Silences
The pressure to remain silent in the face of anti-Japanese sentiment could be
even stronger for Japanese Americans loudly demanding recognition of their
constitutional rights. Portland’s most outspoken Nisei challenger to orders of
internment was a lawyer, the only Japanese American to have been admitted to the bar
before World War II, Minoru Yasui.177 Yasui was the son of a prominent Hood River
Issei businessman Masuo Yasui, who like Daiichi Takeoka and other influential Issei,
had been arrested by the FBI in early 1942 prior to internment orders. When General
John L. DeWitt placed a curfew on all people of Japanese descent in zones including
Portland, Yasui challenged the order in court based on his conviction that no “military
authority has the right to subject any United States citizen to any requirement that does
not apply equally to all other citizens.”178 The day the orders went into effect, he
walked up to a police officer and insisted on being arrested. In connection with his test
case, Yasui was escorted from the Minidoka internment camp to the Multnomah
County jail in downtown Portland in November 1942.179 Yasui spent nearly a year in
solitary confinement awaiting the determination of his appeals, with almost no visitors.
Despite limited contact, Yasui was aware of anti-Japanese organizing in
Portland. Writing to the editor of the Minidoka Irrigator, Yasui was the only Oregon
Nisei willing to engage Pierce’s racially exclusive rhetoric publicly. He called Pierce’s
spurious public warnings about supposedly high Japanese birth rates merely “an echo
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of previous cries of yellow peril.” Yasui denounced Pierce for his racial definition of
Americans writing:
His concluding statements mark him as a race hater, and as an un-American
demagogue. The issue ought not to be whether the Pacific Coast should remain
“white” or “yellow.” The issue ought to be whether the Pacific Coast will
remain American or degenerate into a land of “superior whites.” I believe
Pierce would be willing to destroy Americanism for sake of “white man’s”
superiority. 180
This statement is the most direct refutation of Oregon racism in the press at the time,
even when compared to the Minidoka Irrigator’s own coverage of Pierce.181
Fearing a backlash, the national Japanese American Citizens League (JACL),
which had its own beneficial relationship with the WRA, condemned Yasui’s protests
as part of its policy of saving civil rights advocacy for the postwar period. In 1943, the
National JACL public relations spokesman Mike Masaoka condemned Yasui and
other “self-styled martyrs” who sought to test army curfew orders. His statement
included ten reasons to condemn Yasui’s actions, including the belief that the first
duty of all Americans was to obey Army orders, the argument that such test cases
would be better pursued after the war, the conclusion that cooperation with evacuation
orders did not compromise civil rights, and the insistence that such cases provided a
focus point for anti-Japanese editorialists seeking to brand all Japanese as “treacherous
and dangerous.”182
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Paul Spickard and other historians have noted that JACL aims during the war
era included attempts to establish its leadership in the Japanese American community
and to foster positive relations with government agencies, an effort that predated Pearl
Harbor.183 The 1943 JACL memo supports that view: Masaoka avoided confronting
anti-Japanese sentiment so as not to endanger a beneficial subordinate role vis-a-vis
Army and WRA authorities.
This memo was also part of a larger effort to maintain legitimacy for the JACL
among the larger Japanese American community. As Spickard wrote, strikes by Nisei
at Poston and other WRA camps condemned JACL leaders for their collaboration with
government authorities, leading to a series of beatings of JACL leaders such as
National President Saburo Kido.184 In the wake of such violence, new groups became
more influential in many internment camps. In Minidoka, one such group was the
Civil Liberties League (CLL). Nisei interested in challenging military orders, such as
Portlander George Tani, formed CLL after Minoru Yasui was taken from Minidoka to
stand trial in Multnomah County Court. Their stated purpose was supporting Yasui in
any way possible, while spreading word of his civil rights efforts.185 Thus, when
Masaoka warned in the opposition memo “should we challenge…travel restrictions we
might be damned as fifth columnists,” he sought to undermine the legitimacy of rival
Nisei groups. In response, the Civil Liberties League maintained their support for
Yasui, but divided donations between a fund for general activities and the Min Yasui’s
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Case Fund, giving supporters the option to donate money to CLL efforts without
directly supporting Yasui.186
Civic Leaders Speak Out
Outside of Minidoka, Yasui found little public support for his case, but was
joined in his condemnation of Pierce by two other Oregon figures, Portland banker E.
B. MacNaughton and former Governor and newspaper editor Charles Sprague. Their
willingness to denounce anti-Japanese sentiment in Portland helped to rally church
groups and made them natural spokesmen for the emerging pro-Japanese alliance. As
mentioned above, MacNaughton’s protest of the Portland Business Men’s Club’s 1943
anti-Japanese resolution was unsuccessful in preventing the resolution from passing.
However, his opposition gained the approval of church groups in Portland such as the
committee on International Justice and Good Will of the Council of Churches, which
was interested in repealing anti-Asian laws like the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1882.187
Sprague, having lost a gubernatorial primary against Earl Snell in 1942,
returned to his editorial position at the Oregon Statesman. Between 1943 and 1945,
this editorial page became the public voice of the clash between anti-Japanese and proJapanese groups. In 1943, in one of what would become many articles on the right of
Nikkei to return to Oregon, Sprague claimed internment was not “creditable to
American standards” and that Mahoney’s proposed memorial in the Oregon legislature,
to deport Japanese Americans whom Sprague considered loyal to the United States,
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Soon after, Pierce began

writing editorials in response that reveled in the “rabble-rouser” status with which
Sprague had labeled him. The resulting battle of articles won sympathy for both
sides,189 most importantly causing the Portland Council of Churches to see Sprague as
an important advocate for the Nikkei community.190
The Hood River Effect
By late fall 1944, Supreme Court cases challenging the constitutionality of the
Japanese incarceration appeared more and more destined for victory with the likely
result of a lifting of exclusion orders before the end of hostilities with Japan.
Frustrated by legislative defeats, and interested in keeping Japanese American
farmland, the Hood River American Legion redoubled its efforts to portray Japanese
Americans as racially ineligible for citizenship. On 29 November 1944, the Hood
River post removed the names of sixteen Nisei soldiers from a plaque honoring Hood
River servicemen, a public demonstration of the post’s belief that Nisei soldiers fought
for reasons other than loyalty to the United States. Post officials claimed Nisei soldiers
had dual citizenship with Japan, and thus were loyal to Japan.191
To explain the removal, Hood River Post commander Jess Edington produced
a ten-page pamphlet, a manifesto for the anti-return movement in Oregon. The
pamphlet described Japanese immigrants as covetous of the “Pacific slope with all its
wealth.” They were part of a conspiracy “to take up the old sure game of infiltration
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by reproduction, looking forward to the time that they will again bid for domination of
the Pacific Area.”192 Using little in the way of evidence, the pamphlet claimed that
Japanese diminished property values and that, to avoid the “Japanization” of Hood
River Valley, the Oregon 1923 Alien Land Law should be enforced, codicils on all
Hood River real estate should ban the sale of property to Japanese, and a corporation
should be set up to buy up all remaining Japanese owned property.193 Striking out
against defenders of Japanese Americans, the pamphlet also blamed the Pearl Harbor
incident and U.S. casualties in the Pacific on the “ministerial associations, pacifists,
and enemy agents” who defeated the 1920s American Legion effort towards universal
military service.194
The Hood River post’s actions provoked an almost immediate response among
civic nationalists in Portland, and brought a storm of negative press on Oregon and the
American Legion. Coincidentally, Roger Baldwin, national director of the American
Civil Liberties Union, happened to be speaking to the Portland City Club on 1
December, two days after the name removal.195 Baldwin had been less than supportive
of Japanese American civil liberties skirmishes and was coming to give a speech
claiming civil rights had fared much better in World War II than it had in World War
I.196
Conversation following Baldwin’s speech turned to the Hood River removal.
Under a withering barrage of questions, Edington announced that Hood River did not
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want the return of any Japanese Americans.

72
Baldwin condemned the post saying, “I

should presume that the American Legion, as a great patriotic organization should be
the first to accept all veterans—regardless of race. It is a matter of great regret when
race prejudice of any sort takes precedence over patriotism.”198 Reverend H. J.
Maulbestch, president of the Portland Council of Churches, echoed Baldwin’s
criticism, warning of “serious consequences in Asia if we permit race prejudice to
govern our actions.”199 Shortly after the City Club meeting, Baldwin sent Gus
Solomon, the Oregon ACLU representative, a letter urging him to file a case testing
the constitutionality of a quadriplegic Nisei veteran returning to Hood River.200 The
news in Hood River provoked both public condemnation and a renewed legal effort to
aid Japanese Americans in Portland.
The City Club meeting also indicated to some American Legion officials that
anti-Japanese rhetoric could have political consequences. Mahoney, present as a
representative of the Oregon Department of the American Legion, was suddenly
backed into a corner. Church groups in Portland had vocally opposed anti-Japanese
memorials he introduced in 1943, but saved the majority of their criticism for the
memorials themselves, rather than for Mahoney personally.201 Forced to make a
statement that was certain to be published in Portland newspapers, Mahoney

197

Ibid.
“Churches Rap Legion Act,” Oregonian, 4 Dec 1944, 1.
199
“Race Feeling Under Attack,” Oregonian, 4 December 1944, 11.
200
Gus Solomon Oral History, Oregon Jewish Museum, Tape 6, Side 1.
201
“Women Oppose Jap Deportation,” Oregonian, 5 March 1943, 5.
198

73
equivocated. He refused to condemn the Hood River post publicly, but claimed that
“such action was up to individual posts,” and more removals could follow.202
The name removal soon became a nationwide issue leading to an embrace of
civic nationalism and demonization of racial exclusion in Portland. Articles in
newspapers across the country reported outrage at the Hood River post’s honor roll
removal, placing increased pressure on the national American Legion to disavow the
removal. Secretary of War Henry Stimson called the removal “Not consistent with
democratic ideals,” reinforcing the notion that Nisei soldiers had proven their loyalty
and valor in combat in Italy.203 Assistant Director for the WRA and American Legion
member Robert D. Cozzens claimed “I know that your disgraceful act cannot be
condoned by a vast majority of American Legionnaires…nor by the lost battalion
rescued in the war by Nisei…you have betrayed the Legion.”204
Soldiers writing from the front joined Cozzens and Stimson in response to a
Stars and Stripes article on the removal.205 Many bristled at the possibility of being
described as “missionaries for Jap hating.” One Captain from Hood River claimed that
if the Nisei names were not restored, he wanted his removed.206 Oregonian Sgt. J. B.
Jones wrote from France “people back home ought to know that if it wasn’t for the
Nisei, a lot of their sons would be dead now.”207 Jones refers here to the 442nd combat
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unit’s push to save the “lost battalion,” in which Nisei soldiers suffered heavy
casualties to save a white unit that was trapped behind German lines.208 U.S. Marine
and University of Oregon History professor Harold J. Noble also told the City Club
that, “the Japanese government realizes full well that these Japanese American
soldiers of America are their most implacable enemies.”209 A number of other
American Legion posts also condemned the action; in fact one New York Post
offering to put the sixteen removed names up on their honor roll.210 Such articles
created a dialectic between racial antagonists at home and the valor of Japanese
Americans abroad that became a powerful argument for the loyalty of Japanese
Americans. The public was willing to accept anti-Japanese sentiment to a point, but
questioning the loyalty of American soldiers was beyond the pale.
The confrontation at the City Club and later negative press curtailed some of
Mahoney’s less-public anti-Japanese organizing. In 1944, Mahoney became involved
with the American League of California, a newly formed anti-Japanese organization of
produce dealers and flower merchants based in Los Angeles. The League created a
Council on Alien Relations, whose articles of incorporation benignly describe itself as
a corporation interested in the buying and selling of various forms of property by U.S.
citizens “who are interested in aliens.” The Council’s list of objectives however,
shows that it called for standard anti-return aims. For instance, the Council called for
preventing the return of Japanese Americans and the deportation of disloyal Japanese
Americans “under special treaty arrangements.” Mahoney sat on the board of
208
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governors of that council and had suggested that Pierce serve as well. W.W. Gray,
writing for the council, assured Pierce that all activities would “be along dignified
lines” so as not to bring condemnation on members.211
In November 1944, Mahoney was also involved in the formation of Oregon
Anti-Japanese Incorporated in Gresham, a rural suburb of Portland. A grocer named
Ralph Hannan, the mayor of Gresham, H. H. Hughes, and attorney C.G. Schneider,
founded Oregon Anti-Japanese Incorporated with the purpose of promoting an
amendment to the state constitution to bar the return of Japanese Americans to
Oregon.212 This group had the backing of Mahoney, who formed a sister group in
Portland with the intention of making Oregon Anti-Japanese Incorporated a statewide
organization.213
Oregon Anti-Japanese Inc was distinctive for its incendiary rhetoric. Speaking
to an Oregon Journal reporter, an organizer for Oregon Anti-Japanese Incorporated
warned of violence towards Japanese Americans in Oregon if they were allowed to
return. Telling a tale of narrowly averted violence, Price said a Japanese American,
out on permit from Tule Lake, had visited a farm belonging to a World War II veteran.
As Price told it, “the infuriated veteran immediately chased after the Japanese” with a
knife he had been using to cut cauliflower.214 This implicit threat betrayed the
meaning behind Oregon Anti-Japanese Inc.’s stated purpose to “get this job [Japanese
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exclusion] done before the boys come back, because if we don’t do it, the returning
servicemen will.”215
The articles provoked a response by the Oregonian’s editorial board. The
board called the reasons for organizing Oregon Anti-Japanese Inc. “economic, not
patriotic” in that they sought to prevent future competition in agriculture.216
Furthermore, they took the group to task for its “unwarranted assumption” that
soldiers would attack returning Japanese Americans. Gresham businessmen and
farmers, the board said, had no right to speak for soldiers fighting abroad, some
alongside Nisei soldiers in Italy and France.217 This marked a turning point for the
Oregonian editorial board, which had previously racially denigrated all Japanese
without distinguishing between citizens of Japan and Japanese Americans.218 The
Oregonian strengthened their stance two weeks later proclaiming, “the great law
abiding majority of Oregon citizens will not tolerate persecution of the Japanese
minority. They will not countenance the return of the Ku Klux Klan.”219
Portland’s Pro-Nisei Alignment
Once the settlement era began in earnest after 17 December 1944, plans by
Portland church groups, civic leaders, and War Relocation Authority officials for the
return of Japanese Americans began to take form. On 30 November 1944, the Portland
YWCA received a letter from the Chairman of the YWCA’s Western Regional
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Council, Bartlett B. Heard, urging the Portland chapter to form a local committee to
aid the relocation efforts of Japanese Americans to the Portland area, citing the lack of
any local association focused on the issue. Heard cited the many YWCA efforts to aid
relocation, such as the Student Relocation Council, which helped Japanese Americans
find housing, employment, and good will in their new communities. In Heard’s
opinion, the Japanese Americans’ return to Portland deserved the same support as
Nisei relocating East of the exclusion zones.220 At a meeting on 12 December 1944,
the Portland YWCA Board of Directors decided it was time the Portland chapter
declared publicly that it was ready to aid returning Japanese Americans. On 16
January 1945, the Board approved this statement:
The purpose of the YWCA has always been to serve women and girls without
regard to race, color, or creed. Many young women and girls of Japanese
descent were members of the Portland Association prior to their evacuation,
and have continued their affiliation and YWCA activities in the relocation
centers. We now affirm the historic attitude of the YWCA toward all persons,
and stand ready again to be of service to persons of Japanese ancestry, and to
receive them into our Association, whenever the government of our country,
with its unique facilities for complete investigation of loyalty, permits their
return to this area.221
Although the YWCA did not create a specific committee to aid returning Japanese
Americans, they finally went on record as supporting them, an act the YWCA had
largely refrained from in the internment era.
Local WRA officials Henry Fistere and Clyde W Linnville were much more
focused in their efforts to aid Japanese Americans returning to Portland. The Portland
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Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation was first formed when WRA Northwest Area
supervisor Henry Fistere spoke at a meeting in Portland. Fistere, Reed college
professor Blair Stewart, and Lorene Rickert formed the group in the hopes of helping
returning Japanese Americans find both housing and employment. 222 Linville, as the
Portland representative for the WRA, made it a point to respond to public acts of antiJapanese discrimination whenever they came to his attention.
A number of local lawyers also came to the aid of Japanese Americans through
public statements and investigations. Gus Solomon, the Portland representative of the
ACLU had urged, although unsuccessfully, that the national organization to support
the Minoru Yasui test case in 1942. He had also urged the Portland chapter of the
American Jewish Congress to oppose internment in 1942, even though he ended up as
the only Jewish leader to stand up for the issue.223 Thus when a reporter from the
Oregonian called him for a comment in response to the lifting of exclusion orders,
Solomon claimed: “I’m glad to see the exclusion order rescinded. We were thinking
seriously of filing several suits along the coast to test the constitutionality of the order.
I hope the Japanese are brought back gradually and established in communities where
they will be well received.”224 Supporting returning Japanese Americans was a way
for Solomon to assuage his personal guilt at not supporting Japanese Americans
previously.225
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This turned out to be a bold statement. In response to the article, Solomon
received numerous angry phone calls, some of which threatened to blow up his house.
His statement also gained the attention of Betty Sale of the National Conference of
Christians and Jews, who had been working with the Portland Council of Churches at
the YWCA. She also called Solomon to ask him to start attending meetings planning
aid to Japanese Americans.226 Solomon soon became a key figure in the group,
speaking in churches about the desirability of the return of Japanese Americans, and
helping returning Japanese Americans regain their land in Gresham and Hood River.
Exclusionists Face Increasing Pressure
Anti-Japanese organizing in Portland in the return era faced significant
challenges. The Japanese Exclusion League had serious difficulty finding a meeting
place in Portland due to the opposition of MacNaughton and church groups.227
Reverend Maulbestch of the Portland Council of Churches had signed a public
resolution calling for the “constitutional treatment of Japanese Americans.” He
received a storm of angry phone calls, confirming the presence of a number of
Portlanders who believed Japanese Americans did not deserve constitutional rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, but Portland leaders willing to publicly
condemn Rev. Maulbestch were in short supply.228 Other than random editorials,
arguments for tolerance towards Japanese Americans went uncontested in the press.
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Faced with a lack of support in Portland and open opposition from church
groups, and an Oregon Anti-Japanese Inc. more interested in defending local claims to
property rather than the statewide campaign he had in mind, American Legion
attorney Thomas Mahoney withdrew from anti-Japanese organizing. He claimed his
Portland group was opposed to racial discrimination and had no “sympathy with the
movement.”229 He also later refused to sponsor a second series of anti-Japanese
memorials in 1945.230
Correspondence between Pierce and other anti-return organizers shows their
increasing marginalization. Richard G. Scott, an organizer for the Japanese Exclusion
League (JEL), lamented the silence that followed his letters to Oregon state
representatives. I “have had no reply yet [to requests for anti-Japanese legislation in
the Oregon statehouse],” Scott observed, “perhaps he has been struck with the same
disease of silence that hit Morton Tompkins [head of the Oregon State Grange] and
the Legion heads, and Tom Mahoney.” Scott especially blamed “easy to dupe” church
groups and their “big mission interests in Japan” for the anti-Japanese movement’s
inability to get a fair airing of grievances in the press.231 Later, in writing the
California Council on Alien Relations, Pierce told the group Mahoney reversed his
opposition to the Japanese and that he was having a hard time finding a state
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representative “who would brave the displeasure of the Portland papers by fathering”
an anti-Japanese resolution.232
C. G. Schneider, attorney for the JEL, wrote Pierce looking for an explanation
for Mahoney’s change of heart as well as to set up a public JEL meeting in Portland.233
Pierce had no explanation about Mahoney, adding that a meeting in Portland was
probably out of the question. He claimed to have received a number of “invitations to
speak on the Japanese issue,” but since November 1943 all had been canceled due to
the efforts of business leaders in Portland interested in cheap labor and church groups
interested in converts.234 Public organization in Portland would be futile because of
opposition from the press, church groups, and business leaders like E. B.
MacNaughton. By early 1945 in Portland at least, the movement to oppose the return
of Japanese Americans lost all possibility of receiving favorable press.
Seeking support outside of Portland, Pierce and JEL officials sponsored a
series of public meetings to collect funds for their organization. They held their first
public meeting 8 February 1945 in Gresham. The meeting featured Edington of the
American Legion, Pierce, and Schneider of the Gresham-based JEL. The speakers
continued calls for deportation of all Japanese after the war due to a race-based loyalty
to Japan and enforcement of the 1923 Alien Land Law. More than one thousand
people from all over Multnomah County, including a large delegation from Portland,
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attended. Scott asked attendees to join JEL, paying $10 in initial membership and one
dollar per month after.235
Most consequentially, Pierce demanded that Governor Snell and the state
legislature take action on the issue of evasion of the Alien Land Law.236 On 26
February, the same groups brought their argument to legislative hearings, at which
only one representative questioned calls for Japanese deportation.237 The very next day,
Snell introduced an update to the 1923 Oregon Alien Land Law designed to bring it in
line with similar measures in California.238 Perhaps in memory of the political power
of the 1920s Oregon Klan, all state senators and all but two state representatives
supported the bill for fear of a political backlash.239
The same day the Oregon Alien Land Law of 1945 passed the legislature,
Sprague, MacNaughton, Harold Fistere of the WRA, and Norman Coleman of the
Portland Citizen’s committee spoke to a crowd of five-to-six hundred in Gresham to
counteract the growing power of the JEL in rural parts of Multnomah county. Sprague
and Fistere both argued that the return of Japanese Americans was completely up to
the U.S. Army, and it was their duty to comply. Coleman went further, arguing against
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the charge that Japanese labor depressed wages, but MacNaughton truly captured the
idealism of the growing civic nationalism in Oregon. He said:
We are at a crossroads…the great evil of the war is not physical but spiritual;
not the ruin of cities and killing of bodies but the perversion of all that is best
in men’s spirit to serve the purposes of destruction, hate, cruelty, avarice,
deceit, and revenge…In the confused and dreadfully anxious postwar days
ahead of us our state and nation may face other appeals to prejudice. We know
that happened in Europe. That can happen here. 240
MacNaughton’s comparison of anti-Japanese activism to fascism represents an
important shift in public discourse on racial issues. Whereas the Oregon Voter viewed
anti-Japanese racism as a valid viewpoint, MacNaughton made a deliberate
comparison between Nazi ideology and the exclusion of Japanese Americans.241
Given the racial basis for many of Schneider and Pierce’s arguments, such a portrayal
was impossible to counter in the press. Subsequently, the JEL quickly lost support in
rural areas, despite the fact that Japanese exclusion aided many farmers seeking to
hold on to Japanese land leased to them by the Farm Security Administration during
internment.242
Over the course of the Spring, the Citizen’s Committee gained ground in these
public meetings, JEL audiences dwindled, and pro-Japanese groups became more
bolder in their calls for tolerance. For instance, when students at Sherwood High
School discovered that their auditorium was to be used for a JEL meeting, they
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distributed cards disputing JEL claims and denounced speakers’ remarks during the
meeting.243 In June 1945, the Portland Citizen’s Committee also used local
connections to block a boycott of Japanese American grown produce.244
Accounts of gains by the Portland Citizen’s committee filtered into Minidoka
by way of the Minidoka Irrigator. Editorials in the Irrigator portrayed MacNaughton
and Fistere’s efforts as similar to the efforts of white soldiers working with Nisei
soldiers on the battlefields in Europe. Nisei editors used the Portland Citizen’s
Committee meetings to spur returning Nisei to erase the public space between their
Japanese and American identities. They claimed that, in the “fight for America’s
principles, we owe it to them [Caucasian allies] to show by our attitude that we are
standing with them in the front lines.” The alternative was to show bitterness about the
loss caused by incarceration, which would undermine solidarity with whites.245
Hachiya, an early returnee businessman, embraced connections to the military
because those connections were key to the pro-Japanese argument in Oregon at the
time. Portland in 1945 had experienced a dramatic shift towards civic nationalism.
Japanese Americans interested in carving out a space for the Nikkei community had
discovered that an embrace of the U.S. Army as a force fighting for freedom and
democracy fostered public acceptance. The connection allowed both Japanese
Americans and white Americans in Portland to embrace civic nationalism together.
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This vision of Nikkei-Caucasian solidarity had little to do with the realities that
returning Japanese Americans faced, but was nonetheless a powerful argument for
Nikkei acceptance in postwar Portland.
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Chapter 4: Experiments in Acceptance

Focusing on the resettlement period allows the historian to step from behind
the traumatic veil of internment. It allows a focus not on the abusive agency of Federal
authorities in curtailing civil rights but also on Nikkei strategies of gaining acceptance,
both through court cases against discriminatory laws and through alliances with the
white community. The fact that many Japanese Americans proclaimed their loyalty
based on an image of the patriotic service of the 442nd Combat Team of the US Army
must not be allowed to overwhelm all other narratives of acceptance. One must be
careful when investigating this period not to simplify campaigns to aid the Japanese
American community only within the context of civil rights. For a majority of
Portland’s Japanese Americans, economic concerns took precedence over the more
lofty goals of gaining the full rights, privileges, and duties of American citizenship.
The situation in Portland was unique compared to other West Coast Japanese
American communities in that key Issei continued community leadership roles after
internment. The Issei, who constituted the majority of returnees to Portland in early
1946 (there were 463 Issei and 396 Nisei),246 played a key role in overturning legal
statutes that challenged their ability to seek a livelihood in Portland. Portland Issei
leaders, working with Nisei associates, initiated a test case of the Oregon Alien Land
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Law in 1946, finding significant support in the larger community through a very
successful funding raising drive.
During 1946, associated members of the national organization also reorganized
the Portland chapter of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL). Although the
Portland chapter was fairly active between 1946-1948, leadership constantly
complained of a lack of participation in their activities and a lack of interest in the
JACL’s civil rights program. Furthermore, fund raising activities by the Portland
chapter were often much less successful than Issei ventures. The correspondence
between National JACL leaders reveals conflicts over finances and directives that
sought to subordinate local efforts to the cause of a national civil rights campaign. The
archives of the Portland Chapter JACL and the Oregon Nikkei Legacy Center
Archives tell the story of this fledgling chapter and bring to light the choices made by
Japanese Americans in the face of continuing economic discrimination.
White Progressives Shift Focus
In 1946, proponents of civil rights for the Nikkei were ready to declare victory.
The same press that had decried the injustice of internment began to describe the
decline of public anti-Japanese bigotry as a victory of the spirit of “true Americanism”
over intolerance. Writing for the Associated Press, journalist Ann Reed Burns used the
state of Caucasian-Nikkei public relations as a barometer of tolerance in Oregon as a
whole. She pointed to the restoration of Nisei soldier names to the American Legion’s
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public honor role, the disappearance of “no Jap trade” signs, and the lack of violent
incidents as proof of the transient nature of anti-Japanese sentiment in Oregon.247
In the Saturday Evening Post, William L. Worden attributed former antiJapanese organizations as the product of a few agitators, now sullen in their failure to
prevent the return of Japanese Americans to the West Coast. He described them as
“unrepentant, and still disgruntled about tactics of the WRA, but…prepared to get
along with their Japanese neighbors.”248 Leading figures of the anti-Japanese
movement in Oregon were certainly unapologetic. For instance, until his death in 1954,
former governor Walter M. Pierce remained avidly anti-Japanese because of his belief
in Anglo-Saxon supremacy.249 Like the Oregon Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s, the
Japanese Exclusion League was reviled by the press and then forgotten.
Between January 1945 until the summer of 1946, Portland religious leaders,
the Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation, and officials from the War Relocation
Authority (WRA), spearheaded relief efforts in employment, housing, and public
image issues. The shuttering of the concentration camps in late 1945 led to the
winding down of aid work conducted by the War Relocation Authority (WRA).
Northwest officials of the WRA, especially Northwest Area director Harold S. Fistere
and Oregon relocation officer Clyde W. Linville, worked closely with the Portland
Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation to help relocatees find work and shelter in
Portland. The Northwest section of the WRA worked with other federal agencies to
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aid Japanese Americans. In June 1945, the Federal Housing Authority opened federal
public housing to Japanese Americans in Portland, Seattle, and several other cities to
meet a sever housing shortage.250 Furthermore, during the height of the public return
debate in early 1945, these WRA officials countered each public anti-Japanese
meeting with one urging equal treatment of all citizens. Although Fistere and Linville
tried their best to remain out of the public eye, they were passionate advocates for
returning Japanese Americans. They were especially helpful in overcoming antiJapanese boycotts in Portland and Hood River.251
Linville and Fistere also published a number of pamphlets to aid Japanese
Americans returning to the Northwest.252 One of these guides took the form of an
extended letter to relocatees, in which Linville detailed the various Federal agencies,
lawyers, and community organizations available to them. He also expressed
confidence that “the situation in Oregon is well in hand and that your various needs
are being and will continue to be met.” The Portland WRA office was slated to close
on 31 May 1946.253
Days before the office closed, a group of 200 Issei and Nise,i led by Issei
community leader Daiichi Takeoka and Nisei veterans Bill Oda and Charles
Shimomura, held a testimonial dinner to thank the WRA, the Portland Citizens
Committee to Aid Relocation, and local church groups. At the dinner, Linville
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described the continuing racial problems the Nikkei would face in the postwar era.
Locally, the Portland City Council’s continuing ban on municipal business licenses for
Issei posed a bar to reestablishing businesses lost in 1942. Also, Issei were still barred
from land ownership in Washington, California, and Oregon. Linville challenged the
Issei to overturn the laws, hoping “someone will find occasion to make a real test of
them.” Irvin Lechliter, the Seattle Regional Attorney for the WRA, went further,
claiming, “[I] would like to see alien land laws in the three western states knocked out
entirely” and “the group of aliens in the United States who are progenitors of the 442nd
Combat Team certainly are entitled to citizenship.” 254 Thus, this dinner represents a
passing of the torch in the effort to secure rights of the Issei to the Oregon Nikkei
community with the long-term goal of full citizenship.
White liberals in Portland still had plenty of work to do in the name of racial
justice. Speaking to a reporter in 1946, Fannie K. Friedman of the WRA stressed, “as a
result of exclusion, many persons of goodwill have become interested for the first time,
in racial problems and in helping minority groups.”255 The “White Trade Only” signs
prevalent in downtown business windows of the time affected more than just Japanese
Americans. The growing African American population in Portland faced many of the
same barriers to social and economic equality. The Portland populations of Japanese
Americans and African Americans had been roughly similar in the prewar period,
roughly 2000 individuals each.256 The Japanese population diminished by thirty
percent while the African American population grew to approximately 20,000 due to
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an influx of workers coming to the Kaiser Shipyards.
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Accordingly, civil rights

advocacy in Portland shifted largely to African American issues. For instance, key
members of the Portland Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation, such as Lansing E,
Kempton and George Thomas, both from the Portland Council of Church’s
Commission on Race Relations, helped organize a Race Relations Clinic on 20
September 1945 designed to discus problems faced by minorities in housing and
employment.258 The workshops focused almost exclusively on challenges African
American economic and political rights.259
The first Nikkei community leadership group to emerge was a joint Issei-Nisei
group called the Community Affairs Committee (CAC). This group was an even
mixture of pre-war Issei community leaders, such as Daiichi Takeoka, former
president of the Japanese Ancestral Society, Iwao Oyama, owner of the Portland paper
Oshu Nippo, Ted Hachiya, Nisei hotelier, and Kimi Tambara, former editor of the
Minidoka Irrigator. The CAC held regular meetings at the Nichiren Buddhist Church
and served as the sole community organization available to help Issei unable to speak
English. This group was also the only all-Japanese American group Linville
recommended as a source of aid to Japanese Americans returning to the Portland
area.260 The Nisei on the committee were largely new to community leadership. They
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assumed the place of previous JACL leaders such as Hito Okada and Minoru Yasui
who moved on to National JACL leadership during the internment period.
The CAC provided general aid to returnees, but also sought to eliminate local
anti-Japanese statutes that continued to bar their participation in the Oregon economy.
Takeoka recognized that the Issei faced significant hurdles to reestablishment in
Oregon. The WRA had been unable to address issues such as the Portland City
Council’s ban on municipal business licenses for Issei and the Oregon Alien Land
Law.261
Takeoka had long sought to repeal the Oregon Alien Land Law. When the law
first appeared in the Oregon Legislature, passing in 1923, he hired white lawyers from
Portland to lobby the Oregon Legislature on behalf of the Japanese Association.262
Takeoka, a graduate of the University of Oregon Law School in 1912, was well
respected in Portland’s white legal community. However, he was not admitted to the
Oregon Bar because he could not obtain United States citizenship. Because he could
not practice law in Oregon, he, like many other educated Issei in Portland, went into
business working with Japanese American farmers as a fertilizer salesman.263 Through
these duties and through his capacity as a member of the Japanese Association, he
served as a legal advisor for much of the Oregon Nikkei community. Thus, shortly
after the act became law, Takeoka helped Issei all over the state evade the law by
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Up until the beginning of World

War II, he served as the chief Issei advocate for the legal avenues of redress to statutes
targeting Japanese Americans in Oregon.
Many historians have noted how Issei community leaders ceded authority to
the Nisei during internment. Paul Spickard has written that Issei heads of families in
WRA camps saw their role as providers and decision makers undermined. This
facilitated a shift in community leadership to the Nisei, through the JACL and other
groups, during and after incarceration.265 Azuma, however, amends Spickard’s general
argument, claiming that the legal challenge to the Oregon Alien Land Law was largely
an Issei venture in which the Portland JACL played a support role.266 Azuma does not
make clear, however, that the Portland JACL had yet to re-form in April 1946 when
the project was initiated. The effort to overturn the Oregon Alien Land Law was an
Issei-led venture, demonstrating a transwar continuity of Issei leadership in the
Portland Nikkei community.
Given that Spickard’s assessment was true of the West Coast Nikkei
Community in general, Portland can be said to have had unusually active Issei. The
reason may be the nature of their incarceration. Takeoka, Oyama, Masuo Yasui, and
four other Issei were board members of the Japanese Association of Oregon, who
received commendations from the Japanese Foreign ministry in 1940 at the 2600th
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Anniversary Celebrations of the Japanese Empire.
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Awardees were named

“civilian[s] of merit” and received an ornamental wooden cup for their personal
achievements and services rendered to the Japanese government. Presumably, these
awards were the reason these Issei were arrested and held by the FBI as dangerous
alien enemies during World War II.
Unlike other Issei detained in this manner, cup recipients were generally not
allowed to join their families in WRA camps. Oyama’s son Albert speculated after
reviewing his father’s Department of Justice (DOJ) dossier that, because his father had
received the wooden cup, he had been held in DOJ camp until as late as January 1946,
even though he had been eligible for parole as early as November 1944.268 Unlike Issei
who were moved to WRA camps, the Issei in DOJ camps did not abdicate leadership
to the Nisei. When Takeoka returned to Portland in July 1945,269 and Oyama returned
in January 1946, they quickly resumed leadership roles in the Portland Nikkei
community.
In April 1946, the CAC formed the Oregon Alien Land Law Test Case
Committee. Chaired by Takeoka, the Test Case Committee initially focused on a fundraising campaign.270 According to Portland Nisei Ted Hachiya, who donated $500 and
led the drive, Issei and Nisei fund-raisers collected $17,000 in three to four months
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The committee then

secured representation by Verne Dusenbery, who had published a report refuting antiJapanese arguments and claiming the Alien Land Law violated the 14th amendment the
previous year.272 The committee’s civil rights approach was a strategy depending on
legal redress. Considered as a movement, this legal campaign was virtually an allNikkei endeavor with little participation by the white community.
The joint Issei-Nisei CAC represents a lost opportunity for the Portland Nikkei
community. The split that characterized the prewar Portland Nikkei community could
have been avoided in the postwar period. The CAC had the unique opportunity to
reunite the Nikkei community; including former draft resisters, Issei targeted by the
FBI in 1942 for connections to the Japanese Consulate, and fervent supporters of the
Nisei veterans. Although the CAC was concerned about the place of Japanese
Americans in Portland, economic rights took precedence over civil rights. They were
chiefly concerned with clearing the legal hurdles facing Issei farmers and businessmen.
Overcoming these barriers spoke to the entire Japanese American community.
Subsequently, the CAC was able to raise significant funding to combat the Oregon
Alien Land Law. Portland Nisei, however, had their own vision for the postwar Nikkei
community.
Echoes of Camp Life
The closure of WRA offices in Portland coincided with the reorganization of
the Portland chapter of the JACL. Nisei who were members of the national JACL
271
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sought a connection to political debates affecting Japanese American rights at the
federal level through the reformation of the Portland chapter. Mary Minamoto
spearheaded this campaign, becoming a strong advocate in Portland for ideological
orientation surrounding the National legislative campaign. According to a letter sent to
all associated members in April 1946, the National JACL had two goals in improving
Japanese American civil rights: “compensation for losses sustained by the evacuees”
and the removal of the racial bar to naturalization that would nullify anti-Japanese
laws that depended on the phrase “ineligible to citizenship.” The letter also asked
members to urge friends to join the JACL and to support the continuing struggle for
civil rights by paying dues of $5.00 per year. Reflecting common justifications by the
JACL, the letter referenced the efforts of the 442nd. “We believe these dues are not
unreasonable—especially in light of the work that lies ahead. Considered in terms of
the sacrifices which our Nisei soldiers made, they are insignificant.”273 Efforts to
reorganize the Portland JACL chapter maintained the story of 442nd sacrifices as its
central theme.
The Portland Chapter of the JACL was reactivated officially on 11 May 1946
when Hito Okada, former Portlander and National President of the JACL, paid a visit
to Portland’s associated JACL members.274 At the meeting, it was decided that a
movie about the 442nd should be shown to commemorate Memorial Day. However,
none was available, so Minamoto wrote National headquarters to request a record of a
speech by Ben Kuroki, often referred to by the JACL as the first Nisei war hero, along
273
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Minamoto’s desire to play a speech by

Kuroki reveals her commitment to a narrative of redemption for Nisei brought about
by military service, even though this would have alienated some Portland returnees.
Mass incarceration between 1942 and 1945 not only erased the physical and
cultural center of the Japanese American community in Portland that had been
Japantown, it also led to political debates in WRA camps that fractured the Nisei of
Portland. At both Minidoka and Heart Mountain WRA camps, Nisei groups found
themselves at odds with the JACL after organizing their own civil rights-oriented
groups. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Civil Liberties League (CLL)
formed in Minidoka in December 1942 to financially support Minoru Yasui’s
unsuccessful challenge to military curfew orders targeting Japanese Americans. The
Seattle JACL members at Minidoka argued against Yasui’s case contending, in the
words of the National JACL spokesman Mike Masaoka, “that to help Yasui would be
un-American.”276 The leader of the Seattle JACL, Jimmie Sakamoto, publicly
denounced the mostly Portlander CLL leading the group to disband though they
continued to raise money for Yasui’s legal fund.277
The national JACL responded to the emergence of the CLL and other civil
rights-oriented Nisei organizations in 1943 by intensifying their own organization
efforts. A month later, JACL members at Minidoka merged the Portland, Seattle, and
Puyallup chapters, forming a Minidoka chapter of the JACL. The meeting was
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finalized the same day that Mike Masaoka and Hito Okada visited the camp to speak
in favor of Nisei unity.278 Presumably, this allowed the national JACL to influence the
aims of the reforming chapter along the lines of accommodation to the war effort. The
resulting Minidoka chapter was an almost immediate failure, reflecting the low
standing of the JACL among at Minidoka. After only three months, the chapter held
its final meeting in order to liquidate its assets.279 Although no record exists of the
reactions of Portland Nisei to the takeover, Portland Nisei were almost certainly
alienated by high-handed JACL policies.
A somewhat similar situation arose at the Heart Mountain internment camp. At
the end of January 1943, WRA camp newspapers announced plans by Secretary of
War Henry Stimson to create an all Nisei combat unit made up of Hawaiians and
WRA camp Nisei.280 This news was accompanied by talk of the need for a loyalty
questionnaire as well as a draft including incarcerated Nisei. As historian Arthur
Hansen discussed elsewhere, Frank Emi of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee
opposed both on constitutional grounds. The group’s printed materials claimed, “if
democracy and freedom is to exist in this country, then we must uphold the ideals and
principles of the constitution and right the wrongs committed to a minority group.”281
The Nisei of Heart Mountain found Emi’s argument persuasive. Of the 2000
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volunteers for military service the Army expected from Heart Mountain, only 38
enlisted.282
In a public meeting at Heart Mountain in March 1944, JACL leader Nobu
Kawai condemned the movement, claiming, “Let us remember that the majority can
change the constitution and make this a dictatorship if they so desire.”283 The implicit
argument was that draft resisters not only opposed the war effort, but risked provoking
white Americans into even harsher treatment of Japanese Americans. The speech only
served to encourage more Nisei to oppose the draft.284 Kawai then asked Ben Kuroki
to make a speech in favor of volunteering for the Army. Perhaps because he was from
Nebraska and had never been interned, Kuroki’s appearance only served to make him
the public face of what resisters considered government collaborators.285 Later, 800
Nisei became so demoralized by the affair that they renounced their American
citizenship.286
Again, the specific impact of these events on Portland returnees is unclear.
Family members of renunciants would certainly have had mixed feelings about a
continuation of wartime narratives of the 442nd securing freedom for all Nisei in the
postwar period. The Portland JACL papers hold little on the issue of draft resisters or
renunciants, other than mentioning it as a topic of discussion among members of the
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Portland Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation in mid-1946.

287

100
Unlike the JACL, the

Citizen’s Committee had no qualms about aiding Japanese Americans trying to reverse
orders of deportation. The issue would have weighed on the mind of any Japanese
American in the area because Portland was the departure point for all Japanese
Americans that had renounced their citizenship.
Starting in December 1945, groups of repatriates, both Issei and Nisei, began
their journeys to Japan. These ships would have been impossible to miss in the
Portland harbor. At 609 feet long, they were the largest ships ever to dock there.288 For
those standing at docks watching their loved ones sail away to war-torn Japan, the
redemptive story of the 442nd would have rung hollow. Although few accounts of
attitudes towards the draft resisters exist, the JACL used the concept of embittered
Japanese Americans as a means of identifying themselves as patriotic Americans.
An All-Nisei Group Emerges
The reformation of the Portland Chapter of the JACL largely followed the
ideological orientation that helped Japanese Americans find allies within the white
liberal community. It must be recognized that the continuation of the 442nd argument
was itself a choice; it was their chosen strategy of acceptance. The first meeting of the
Portland JACL took place at the Nichiren Buddhist church following a service
organized by the CAC to honor eleven of Oregon’s Nisei soldiers killed in combat.289

287

Mary Minamoto, Letter to Eiji Tanabe at JACL Headquarters, Salt Lake City, 7 June 1946, PDX
JACL Collection.
288
Lawrence Barber, “Japanese Due to Ship Home,” Oregonian, 26 December 1945, p. 12.
289
Kimi Tambara, “Special Memorial Day Rites Honor Oregon Dead,” The Oregon News, May 31,
1946, p. 1.

101
This memorial fit quite well within the wartime, pro-Nisei narrative by emphasizing
the valor of the all-Japanese American 442nd Combat Team that was adopted by the
white reporters seeking to discredit anti-Japanese agitators. These reporters used the
stories of individual Nisei soldiers to shame West Coast racists, whom they saw as a
challenge to the principles of freedom and democracy that legitimized the war effort.
Frank Hachiya, who was honored at the Portland memorial, was a key figure in
putting forward this argument. His story was one of distilled patriotism. The New York
Times said of Hachiya, “Japanese treachery reacted upon Hachiya as upon other
patriotic Americans. To be sure his eyes were slanted, his skin was yellow, his name
different. But Hachiya was an American. He enlisted at once.”290 The article then went
on to describe how Hachiya, who had been serving as an interpreter for a unit in the
Philippines, volunteered to scout a Japanese position after a firefight to gather
information. While doing so, Hachiya was shot by a Japanese sniper. Despite his
wounds, he crawled back to his unit and died shortly after reporting to his commander.
This article transposed the image of Hachiya’s actions with the actions of the Hood
River American Legion, who removed his name from a public honor role a month
before he died.291 The implicit argument was that it was absurd to argue Japanese
Americans held a racial loyalty to the Emperor. The Nisei patriotism argument hoped
to underline the distinction between Japanese subjects and Japanese Americans with
the argument that blood was no bar to patriotic service.
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The memorial service was an attempt by the Issei and Nisei of the CAC to
bring the Nisei patriotism argument into the postwar period. The memorial
emphasized the 442nd unit’s sacrifices during the rescue of the “Lost Battalion” in Italy
in November 1944 and Frank Hachiya’s death in the Philippines. Consecration of the
Portland Nikkei community’s contribution to the war effort represented an effort not
only to establish a connection to an emerging postwar civic nationalism, but also to
reiterate claims of loyalty based on service that had been key to undermining antiJapanese organizing in Portland during 1945. Following the WRA line that attributed
the “6061 decorations” earned by the 442nd as the main reason for improved attitudes
towards Japanese Americans, Portland JACL members made commemorating Nisei
combat efforts the key goal of their organization.292 This event also served as the first
public post-internment meeting of the Portland chapter of the JACL. At the meeting,
group of about thirty Nisei pledged interest in joining a new Portland JACL chapter if
it were to be formed.
Organizational Challenges
The reestablishment of the Portland chapter of the JACL was a difficult
process for local Nisei due to financial hurdles and the National JACL’s lack of
support. After returning to Portland in early 1945, Nisei hotelier Ted Hachiya
attempted to reactivate the local chapter of the Japanese American Citizens League.293
This process was not complete until May 1946.294 The chapter’s records do not
explain the reason for this delay, but an important factor must have been lack of funds.
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Due to the rapid disbanding of the Portland JACL in the Spring of 1942 and the fact
that leaders like Hito Okada had joined the national JACL leaders in Salt Lake City,
their treasury and other assets had either been donated to the national JACL or had
gone missing.295
The lack of sufficient funds was a constant concern for the Portland JACL
early on, and led to conflict with the National JACL. At a meeting of the Portland
Citizen’s Committee in early June 1946, an upcoming Purple Heart Convention was
mentioned.296 The convention was held in August with the purpose of “acquaint[ing]
the public with what every racial group contributed to Victory.”297 Participation in this
event, which demonstrated the Nisei contributions to the war effort, became the
nascent chapter’s first major project. In the words of Minamoto, “since we have had to
face evacuation and many Caucasians are very concerned about our attitude of the
experiences we had to face, I feel that it would be advisable to have a [Nisei]
representative.”298 So as not to be upstaged by other racial groups, the Portland chapter
sought a Distinguished Service Cross holder among the Nisei community. Their
search led them to George Sakato of Glendale, Arizona, who was to attend the
convention on behalf of the JACL and speak at an associated testimonial dinner to
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honor veterans and gold star mothers. The chapter estimated the costs at around
$500.299
Coincidentally, former Portland JACL member Howard Nomura held a bond
belonging to the chapter worth $500. Unfortunately, the bond was not discovered until
October.300 Attempts at canvassing the Nikkei community met with little success
because Hachiya’s fund drive for the Alien Land Law committee was still in full
swing.301 Because the chapter believed that the convention was a national-effort to aid
Japanese Americans, they sent out requests for funding to other chapters, and an
ultimatum to national headquarters. In their letter to the national organization, the
chapter asked the national organization for a loan of $500 until local funds could be
found. Above all, the Portland JACL sought to become more than the mere social club
it was before World War II. If the loan was not forthcoming, they suggested they
would “not accept JACL for our title.”302
Responses to these solicitations indicate the relationship between the Portland
JACL and national leadership. Money was to flow up not down. Most chapters
solicited by the Portland chapter declined with varying levels of annoyance, though
some donated small amounts.303 Hito Okada, JACL national president, responded with
an ultimatum of his own:
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I personally believe that $500.00 can be easily raised by the Japanese people in
Portland. I am sure if the Issei are approached on this particular matter and
they are advised of the tremendous Public Relations agenda for them, that they
would be willing to raise this money for the project. I personally do not think
that enough energy has been expended in Portland to raise the money…I
further believe that if the reactivation of the Portland chapter depends upon
whether or not National will loan them $500.00 at this time, the National
Headquarters too will have to further consider the matter of whether or not we
wish to continue with the reactivation of the Portland chapter. In other words
National Headquarters will not be intimidated into accepting the Portland
Chapter.304
Okada’s message was clear. If you wish to contribute to our cause we welcome you,
but local issues are your own affair. He also sent a memo to all chapters prohibiting
chapters from soliciting money from each other “in order that chapter treasuries shall
not be raided constantly by requests for contributions.” 305 Furthermore, Okada
designated the Issei as the proper source of funding for JACL causes. This assertion
contradicts previous narratives that nearly all Issei were demoralized and destitute
upon their return to the Pacific Coast.306 Some Issei must have still had considerable
resources, which the success of the Alien Land Law Test Case Committee, a drive
designed specifically to aid Issei, also attests to.
Okada’s letter also helped catalyze the dissolution of the CAC. Following
Okada’s terse reply, the Portland Chapter apologized and redoubled their canvassing,
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this time with the aid of Hachiya’s group.
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They eventually raised $837.50 for events

surrounding the Purple Hearts Convention.308 With the receipts for dinner tickets and
other methods of fundraising, their campaign was a financial success because they
turned to Issei donors. Speaking to a donor, Minamoto called the campaign a success,
claiming, “many Caucasian friends were made at the convention.”309 Her sentiments
reflect the belief among Portland JACL leaders that making friends among the white
community was a sure rout to improving their social standing.
In the months following the convention, the Portland JACL solidified this
funding relationship. Hachiya, along with fellow CAC member Kimi Tambara, gained
a seat on the JACL board as co-chair of the political action committee.310 In January
1947, the chapter convinced Issei leaders in Portland, presumably Oyama, Takeoka,
and Yasui, to form a koenkai (mutual support association). Despite reservations of a
“lack of cooperation” exhibited by the JACL to the Japan Society in the prewar period,
the Issei agreed that the two generations needed to work together. Subsequently the
Issei of the CAC agreed to provide funds for a full-time secretary and office for the
Portland JACL.311 By March 1947, Hachiya reported that $1566.50 had been raised by
the Issei who by 1952 came to refer to themselves as the Nikkeijinkai (Japanese
Ancestral Society).312
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Had the JACL at the time accepted Issei members, and had there not been such
a language barrier between the Issei and Nisei, the political leadership of the Portland
Nikkei community might have coalesced in the Portland JACL. Instead, the two
groups, along with other myriad social and religious groups, became a coalition of
leaders similar to what existed at the Portland Council of Churches. Rather than being
separated by denomination, the Nikkei were divided by generation, among other
factors.
The coalition of community leadership of Portland Nikkei and their
relationship to the National JACL guided a very specific strategy of acceptance.
Because the majority of funding came from Portland-area Issei, the Portland chapter
had to tend issues important to the Issei such as the continuing ban in Portland on
business licenses and ongoing instances of discrimination. To ensure continued
funding, they would also need to match their previous advocacy for the 442nd as the
chief narrative of acceptance while also focusing on economic concerns that made the
Alien Land Law fundraising campaign so successful. They would also have to find a
way to participate in National’s legislative campaign to gain naturalization. All of this
would have to be done within the strict parameters of National JACL leadership’s
directives. As war-era experiences with rival Nisei groups and postwar conflicts over
funding attest, the National JACL had a specific vision for the way Japanese
Americans would establish themselves as full-fledged members of American society.
They would tolerate no rivals.
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Chapter 5: Successes, Failures, and Regular Minority Status

For Japanese Americans, returning to Portland following internment meant
integration into an environment of continuing discrimination. Unlike the more
confrontational tactics of sit ins and public protests employed during the civil rights
era, leaders of the Portland JACL almost always worked with white progressives as
well as with the national JACL when trying to improve their social and economic
standing. By working with “Caucasian advisory boards,” the Portland JACL sought
the influence and support of Oregon’s elected officials. Such boards gave a white face
to the cause of Japanese American civil rights. Through their support and through
legal cases, the Nikkei community overcame codified discrimination at the local and
state level only to face discrimination of a more shadowy variety in the form of
employment, housing, and other forms of prejudice that targeted non-whites.
The choice by Portland’s Nisei leaders to work with the national JACL had its
advantages and disadvantages. Association with the national JACL provided Portland
Nisei with a chance to participate in the national campaign for Issei citizenship, efforts
to aid Issei mostly met with apathy from Portland Nisei, and Issei were largely
uninterested in JACL events.313 Furthermore, the national organization was generally
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unsupportive of local social justice efforts unless they were first coordinated with
national headquarters. The result was a chronic lack of participation. The Nisei of
Portland did not help lead a mass movement for civil rights. Instead JACL efforts in
Portland were confined to relatively few people, so few that these individuals often
became burned out by the demands of their positions within the JACL. Conversely,
the Portland Nikkei community could be quick to respond to local crises as shown by
a well-organized relief effort to aid the 900 Nikkei made homeless by the flooding of
the Vanport housing project in 1948.
More Opposition by the Portland City Council
The largest hurdle facing Portland’s Japanese Americans at the local level was
the Portland City Council’s 1942ban on municipal business licenses for Issei. After
Portland license inspector Joe Hutchinson informed the City Council that nearly 200
Issei held licenses with the city, the council voted to cancel those licenses based on the
belief that Issei property would be sold off at a dramatic discount during or after
internment. In the following weeks Mike Masaoka and a number of attorneys
representing Issei businessmen argued that such bans deprived Nisei children of
sustenance and violated Issei human rights.314
Despite Masaoka’s protest of the license ban before the Nikkei incarceration, the
national JACL urged Portland JACL leader Abe Oyamada to avoid picking a fight
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with the Portland City Council. The Portland Council of Churches’ Race Relations
Commission, sought to press the issue using the Nisei Patriotism argument.315 In late
May, the commission sent representatives to petition Portland’s City Council to
rescind the Issei license ban, but they were denied a chance to plead their case. In
response, the commission invited Abe Oyamada, board member of the Portland JACL,
to a committee meeting to gain more information. Specifically, the commission
wanted to know if it was true that the Minidoka incarceration camp had garnered the
most military volunteers. Their plan was to provoke a public confrontation with the
City Council over the license ban, which they thought unfairly targeted both Japanese
nationals and “refugee Jewish emigrants” fleeing the holocaust316 The Race Relations
Commission seemed interested in recreating the Citizen’s Committee meetings held in
rural areas the year before, which effectively used the Nisei Patriotism argument to
counter the Japanese Exclusion League calls for permanent exclusion.
After consulting with Oyamada and Ted Hachiya of the Portland JACL, the
Race Relations Commission decided to forgo their planned confrontational approach,
concurring with the national JACL’s assessment. Hito Okada wrote to Oyamada on
the issue confirming that Minidoka had indeed had the highest number of Army
volunteers. He also recommended a hands-off approach that would avoid negative
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publicity for city commissioners in the months before the 1946 elections.
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The Race

Relations Commission came to the same conclusion when they realized that pushing
the City Council on the issue would likely result in a court case.
Despite widespread support for the campaign to overturn the Alien Land Law,
Issei volunteers willing to press the issue in court were not forthcoming. At a meeting
of the Citizen’s Committee attended by George Thomas of the Race Relations
Commission and members of the Japanese American community, Elizabeth
Dusenberry, Portland YWCA board member, gave a presentation on the state of
Japanese businesses in Portland. Following the presentation, Thomas asked Hachiya
and the other Nisei present if any Issei would be willing to press the issue in court.
Hachiya said he doubted it. Thereafter, the whole license ban issue was left to United
States Department of Justice, which had been in contact with Dusenberry and had
implied that they were ready to act on the matter. So the commission let the matter
drop in the hopes that the City Council would secretly kill the license ban.318
Decisive action was apparently not immediately forthcoming from the
Department of Justice. The Portland City Council did not reverse their position until
January 1947. Special conditions within the City Council motion to grant Issei
business licenses again reflect continuing animosity towards Japanese immigration.
The City Council voted unanimously to rescind the ban, but only for aliens ineligible
for citizenship that had been residents of the United States for ten years or more.319
Uncertain whether Japanese immigration would continue in the postwar, the Portland
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City Council sought to placate the Department of Justice, while also retaining the right
to prevent future unwanted Japanese competition in business. Japanese immigrants
with less than ten years residence were required to appear before the City Council to
receive a business license.320 Concurrent with the character of the ban removal, the
City Council decision came with no public apology.
Afterwards, the Department of Justice contacted National JACL president Hito
Okada to notify him that the City Council had “secretly or otherwise drafted another
[anti-Japanese business ordinance]…which couched in high sounding words is much
worse and more discriminatory than the resolutions they repealed.”321 Although the
new license ban never materialized, its rumored crafting is further evidence that
striking the license ban was no act of contrition by the Portland City Council.
Many Portland Issei were understandably wary of the direction Portland officials
would take in the future, so they did not rush to file new business licenses. According
to 1947 Portland JACL president George Azumano, Issei were able to file new
licenses, but only three applied for them in the first six weeks.322 Many evaded the
municipal license system in much the same way Issei farmers had circumvented the
Oregon Alien Land Law; they filed business licenses under the name of Nisei. For
example, Umata Matsushima owned a thriving general store named Teikoku (Japanese
for “Imperial”) before the Pacific War. He lost everything in the days after the Pearl
Harbor incident when Federal officials closed his store and forced him to sell off his
320
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entire inventory, which was much larger than normal in expectation of holiday sales,
at pennies on the dollar. They then confiscated the money along with the contents of
his bank accounts and he was whisked off to a Department of Justice prison camp for
the majority of the war.323
Matsushima was so demoralized by the affair that he applied for repatriation to
Japan beginning a series of reversals by Federal officials that left his family’s fate in
limbo until he returned to Portland in 1946. In August 1943, Matsushima and his
family were scheduled for departure from Ellis Island, federal officials decided that he
would not sail. He experienced a similar wait in December 1943 at the Army camp in
Crystal City, Texas and again was not allowed to depart. His family’s luggage,
however, left without them, leaving the family with literally nothing but what they
were wearing. He then decided to apply to reverse the repatriation request in
December 1945, but was still scheduled to leave from the Portland along with
renunciants from Tule Lake.324 After a hearing at Tule Lake in March 1946,
Matsushima and his family were released. By June 1946, the Matushimas were living
in the Vanport housing projects. Because his accounts were not returned to him until
1956, Matsushima borrowed $500 dollars to restart his business, called Anzen
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(Japanese for “safety”), which became perhaps the most important Japanese
supermarket in Portland in the early postwar decades. When refounding his business,
Matsushima placed the license under the name of a friend’s daughter, Harue Ninomiya.
Family members later related that he was paranoid that the government would
someday return to take his store and thus likely harbored a deep and well-placed
distrust for the City Council.325
“First Papers”
Members of the City Council were not the only local officials to express a
continued belief that Issei were undesirable foreigners. In July 1946, the national
JACL sent a memo to all its chapters suggesting a model for public meetings to push
the naturalization campaign as a way to make laws targeting Japanese immigrants
obsolete. One of the strategies of the program called for a young Issei to speak about
his desire for citizenship, presenting their birth in Japan as a mere technicality. In the
flyers words, “this person would point out that he represents several thousand such
who would jump at the chance to become naturalized Americans.”326 Following
typical tactics of the postwar JACL, the program also called for the testimony of a
Nisei veteran and “prominent Caucasian.”
The white speaker had a particularly important role in placing the effort in a
transnational context. That speaker was to convey the benefit in eliminating
discriminatory naturalization laws for “America’s place of leadership in the world”
while pointing out the “irony of our teaching democracy to Japan, at the same time
325
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To

demonstrate this to the U.S. Congressional committees considering the naturalization
legislation, the national JACL directed local chapters to urge Issei to file declaration of
intent forms (Form A-2213) with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as
proof of their desire for U.S. citizenship. By August 1946, national JACL leaders
secured an agreement with Ugo Carusi, U. S. Commisioner of the INS, that Issei
would be allowed to file their “first papers” without the interference of local
officials.328 Although the Portland JACL did not hold a public naturalization meeting
according to the national JACL model, they dispelled misinformation about the forms
like the need to file them in order to gain entrance to public housing in Vanport and
publicized the effort.329
Despite the national JACL’s arrangement, Portland INS official Vernor W.
Tomlinson challenged the legitimacy of “first papers” for people of Japanese descent.
A number of Issei from Hood River went to the Portland INS offices in late 1946 to
retrieve the necessary forms to file first papers, because the Hood River office did not
have the necessary paper work. When Mrs. Max Moore, a member of the MidColumbia JACL’s Caucasian advisory board, called Tomlinson to investigate the
reason for these extra trips, he made his anti-Japanese stance clear. The following is a
transcript of the conversation Moore sent to national JACL headquarters:
Clerk Tomlinson: “You know they cannot become citizens.”
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Mrs. Moore: “Yes, we know that and they have been so informed, but they want
to make application for their first papers and they have been told that this
does not mean that they may certainly become citizens.”
Tomlinson: “They will never become citizens. They belong to a race that is
ineligible to become citizens.”
Mrs. Moore: “So did the Chinese and they are now eligible to citizenship and we
believe these people have their rights the same as any of us. There is a bill
now pending in Congress which will give them the right of citizenship and
these people are preparing themselves for that eventuality.”
Tomlinson: “I had a boy in the South Pacific and I hope they never become
citizens.”
Mrs Moore: “ I had a nephew wounded at Pearl Harbor and a boy the Germans
nearly killed but I still think these people have as much rights as any of the
rest of us.”
Tomlinson: “Well, I’ll send the blanks up. How many are there? Do they know
they are committing perjury when they swear they want to become
citizens when they can’t? And I hope they will never be allowed to do so.”
Mrs. Moore: “There are about forty of them. And thank you very much.”330
This conversation does not represent the opinion of the majority of INS officials, but
rather one form of resistance to Issei citizenship. His resistance echoes 1945 battles
over the return of Japanese Americans in that both used their relatives’ military service
as proxy-legitimacy for their stance on Issei citizenship. The real argument here
swings on connection to the Allied victory in World War II, while Tomlinson’s
argument of Japanese racial unassimilbility merits barely a response from Moore.
The episode also demonstrates a lack of institutional interest in punishing such
comments. Despite a strongly worded letter from national JACL secretary Masao
Satow to Carusi complaining about Tomlinson’s attitude towards the parents of Nisei
veterans, the INS was unapologetic. Carusi’s assistant described the affair as a merely
a case of a short supply of forms and makes no apology for either Tomlinson’s anti-
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Japanese sentiment or his misleading argument that Issei filing the forms would be
committing perjury.331
The Alien Land Law Test Case
The Alien Land Law test case campaign is the best example of success achieved
by members of the Japanese American community working with white civic leaders in
the early postwar era. Perhaps at the instigation of his wife, who was a board member
for the YWCA and Citizen’s Committee, Portland lawyer Verne Dusenbery formed a
committee within the Multnomah Bar Association to study challenges to the
constitutional rights of Japanese Americans in Oregon.332 During their study, at the
urging of Governor Earl Snell, Walter Pierce, and the Japaense Exclusion League, the
Oregon Legislature updated the 1923 Alien Land Law so as to “bring about uniformity
in such laws with the state of California.”333
The Japanese American rights committee study concluded that the 1945 Alien
Land Law was the product of economically motivated, rural Anti-Japanese groups.
Those groups manipulated the “patriotic fervor engendered by the war” to buy land
from Japanese Americans at cut rates and that “paradoxically as it may seem, the men
in the service form one of the strongest bulwarks supporting the constitutional rights
of Americans of Japanese ancestry.” Furthermore, the committee claimed that the
Alien Land Laws of both 1923 and 1945 were unconstitutional because even resident
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alien Japanese are entitled to protection under the 14
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Amendment of the US

Constitution.334
It remains unclear why, despite such strong conclusions in favor of defending
Japanese rights, a case was not filed in the Multnomah County Court challenging the
law until April 1947. Historian Amy K. Buck wrote that Dusenbery teamed up with
Alan Hart to craft a case that would overturn both the 1923 and 1945 statutes. In early
1947, Kenji Namba, a Nisei veteran, his father Etsuo Namba, and Florence Donald
volunteered to create a lease that would draw charges from the Multnomah County
district attorney.335
Two factors might explain the delay. First, the Alien Land Law Test committee
did not form until April 1946 and did not collect ample funds for a test case until July
1946. 336 Second, conflict between the Portland chapter and the national JACL
discouraged the pursuit of individual legal attempts that might hinder legal
proceedings sponsored by the national organization. According to WRA accounts,
discussion among JACL leaders in 1946 largely concluded that chapters should take
care not ask too much from white Americans. Quoting a meeting in Colorado in 1946:
I think if we publicize the Nisei too much the Caucasian public is going to get
tired of it, and will begin to hate us…I don’t think we ought to play up all the
little discriminations the Japanese are experiencing. Some of them think we can
simply forget…Sure we can press some cases into court, but we ought not to do
it only once or so. Make it a big court fight, put a lot of money in the case, but
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once it is over we ought to forget it and not continue to press cases into court
over and over again.337
By March 1945, the JACL had already begun to support that one big case. A. L. Wirin,
the law partner of national JACL executive secretary Saburo Kido, sought to overturn
of the California Alien Land Law after the state filed escheat proceedings against San
Diego residents Kajiro and Fred Oyama.338 In California, county governments had
begun to work with state officials to file escheat proceedings of Issei-owned land in a
systematic process of removal that filled municipal coffers while “releasing” valuable
farmland for white use. This was a process not present in Oregon.339
While the Oyama case was awaiting its hearing in the U.S. Supreme Court in
April 1947, Wirin paid a visit to the Portland chapter as a part of a fund raising
campaign that began in January 1947.340 Wirin was crestfallen when he learned that a
case had already been filed in Multnomah County court, thus making use of the ample
funds collected by the Alien Land Law Test Case Committee in 1946. He later wrote
to the Portland chapter president that he thought the case was not advisable, but since
it was filed already there was nothing to do but support it.341 Wirin’s support was tacit
approval, not legal and financial support. Given earlier conflicts with the national
JACL and the fact the Portland JACL did not advertise the case as one of its
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achievements, it seems likely that they had little to do with the Namba case.
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Instead,

the ten members of the Test Case Committee, including Takeoka and Hachiya, were
left to organize the case by themselves, drawing out the process considerably. In 1949,
the case was successful, overturning both the 1923 and 1945 Alien Land Laws.
The Portland Anti-Discrimination Committee
JACL efforts in Portland continued to follow the national model in the 1947
creation of the Portland Anti-Discrimination Committee (PDX-ADC). In December
1946, the Portland JACL sent George Azumano and Kimi Tambara to the West Coast
Action conference in San Francisco. At the conference, Mike Masaoka answered
concerns that the JACL would just be another social organization with a renewed
national civil rights campaign. He wanted to make JACL a stronger organization so it
could “be strong enough to be able to meet any crisis which might arise.” He proposed
the creation of a national network of Anti-Discrimination Committees with two
purposes: local ADCs would allow Issei membership, creating a direct funding stream
from Issei at the local level; and local ADCs would cultivate contacts among the white
community and serve as a network mobilizing local Congressmen and government
officials to support national legislative campaigns. The ADC was to be the direct
action group, while the JACL would be a “fraternal and educational organization.”
Masaoka called on JACL chapters to collect $67,000 to finance the project.343
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Masaoka’s funding campaign mirrored the relationship between the Portland
JACL and the Issei members of the Koenkai, which established a direct funding link
between the Portland Issei and Masaoka’s lobbying efforts. Shifting funding to
national projects was a challenge to Portland JACL’s funding scheme, because Issei
donations to the JACL dwarfed Nisei financial contributions in 1946 and 1947. For
instance, the total membership dues in those two years amounted to $305 and various
other fund-raising events netted $750. The Koenkai, on the other hand, donated $2940.
This donation did not include the $17000 raised for the Alien Land Law Test Case
Committee. Issei contributors followed through on their earlier pledge to support the
Portland JACL financially by paying their operating costs, the $1000 levy asked for by
the national JACL, and left them with about $1000 extra in their treasury.344 After
Azumano founded the Portland ADC, concurrent with his election as Portland JACL
president, in April 1947, there was little reason for Issei to continue donations to the
JACL.345
Masaoka planned to make up for losses in JACL revenue with a national
membership drive. Besides the need for additional funds, membership was a chronic
problem for the JACL in the immediate postwar years. According to a membership
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campaign guide produced by the national JACL, before World War II the national
JACL had twenty thousand members. In early 1947, despite the fact that many more
Nisei, having turned eighteen, were eligible for membership, national membership
dropped to less than three thousand.346 In Portland there were only thirty-two members
before the membership drive.347
Small membership in the JACL in 1946 and 1947 was also a problem of
legitimacy for a group that often claimed they were the only group fighting for
Japanese American constitutional rights. 348 Both the national and Portland JACL
worried that low membership would undermine the national legislative program. In a
national JACL bulletin on the 1947 membership drive, leaders complained:
One of our major emphasis [sic] is to get some national legislation through
Congress. 3000 people, or just a handful, have no business undertaking the job
we are attempting to do. From the standpoint of congressmen, 3000 people
aren’t worth the time and effort. As Mike Masaoka contacts national
organizations, and government agencies, he is asked, ‘how many people do you
represent?’ There are those Nisei among us who resent the JACL representing
them without their permission, so to be honest, Mike must say that he represents
the actual numbers who are signed up as JACL-ers. You can imagine the kind of
rejection this response gets and how sick at the stomach Mike feels.349
In 1947 Mike Masaoka spearheaded a lobbying campaign in Washington D. C. to pass
legislation including HR 3149, Soldier Brides Amendment, HR 3555, naturalization
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for Issei, HR 3566, removing race factors from deportation laws, and HR 3999, the
evacuation claims bill. The JACL knew that sympathy for the wrongs of internment as
juxtaposed with the Nisei Patriotism argument would only get these bills so far in the
U.S. Congress. High membership rolls were needed to prove that Japanese Americans
were an organized constituency in need of consideration. Later in the bulletin, JACL
leaders linked the membership problem to the legislation campaign more explicitly:
IF JACL FAILS IN ITS EFFORTS THIS YEAR [1947] FOR THE NATIONAL
LEGISLATION, IT WILL BE BECAUSE THE MAJORITY OF NISEI DON'T
GIVE A DAMN… [all capitals in the original]…if the Japanese Americans
show only lukewarm interest, what right have we to expect our friends to go to
bat for us? What answer can we give to our fellow Americans of good will and
the Issei who support us when they ask, “If your program is so vital and
important, why don’t the Nisei themselves support it?”350
Nisei seemed to see little benefit in supporting the JACL; that is not to say Nisei did
not follow news of JACL efforts. In 1947, 1,600 JACL members had subscriptions to
the national JACL newspaper Pacific Citizen. The Pacific Citizen’s total circulation,
however, was 6,500.351
The Portland JACL’s frustrations with the membership drive were also tied to
their 1947 fundraising campaign in that both reflected a distinct lack of interest in
supporting the JACL on the part of Portland Nisei. First of all, correspondence with
other JACL chapters led to frustrating comparisons in terms of membership. For
instance, the Milwaukee, Wisconsin, chapter claimed that seventy-five percent of
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Although Portland membership more

than tripled, growing to 115 in 1947, the representation was nowhere near
Milwaukee’s numbers.353 In the 1947 JACL fundraising drive, staffed mainly by Issei,
Mary Minamoto, along with Azumano and Hachiya, often found themselves in an
awkward position when asked by Issei leader Iwao Oyama why Nisei were not joining
the JACL or canvassing for donations needed for local JACL operations and the
national JACL legislation campaign. Minamoto complained bitterly about the problem
in Portland Hi-Lites:
Surely if we are able to raise funds for athletics, etc., we must be able to raise
funds for the national program too. “Isseis [sic] are benefiting from the nationals
program” cries the Nisei but remember Niseis [sic] were not exempted from
evacuation. Issei problems proved to be our problems and will remain to be one
until we learn to combat them.354
In 1947, Portland Nisei reestablished the Nisei Bowling league, with local businesses
sponsoring teams, but were apparently largely uninterested in the political activities of
the JACL.355
Despite the JACL commitment to telling the story of the 442nd Regimental
Combat Team, the ranks of uninterested Portland Nisei included Nisei veterans. In a
separate Portland Hi-Lites article, Minamoto castigated Nisei veterans for failing to
attend the first annual convention of the Oregon and Southern Washington Council
American Veterans Committee. She claimed that no Nisei veterans attended.
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Furthermore, she revealed that no Nisei veterans, besides the veteran from Arizona
they paid to come, attended the Purple Heart Convention in the fall 1946, which was
the first postwar project of the Portland JACL.356 Part of the point of the 1946
convention was to encourage Nisei veterans to join other veterans organizations, like
the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars, thus allowing other American
soldiers to meet Nisei veterans and cultivate more good will for all Nisei.
Faithful to this cause, Toshi Kuge, first president of the postwar Portland JACL,
and fellow Nisei veteran and JACL member Jimmy Mizote, attempted to join the
Portland American Legion Post #1 in 1946. However, in a continuation of wartime
anti-Japanese attitude, the post did not accept their membership and told them to start
their own group.357 In 1947, Toshi Kuge organized 25 Nisei veterans who met at the
Japanese Methodist church to found their own organization, the Nisei Veteran’s
Committee.358 Afterwards, it seems, they were uninterested representing the Nikkei
community to white audiences.
A lack of interest in JACL activities extended to JACL members as well. One of
the greatest problems for individual JACL chapters in the early postwar years was that
nominations to chapter offices, especially president, were constantly turned down. At
the end of 1947, when the Portland chapter nominating committee tried to find
candidates, a large number turned down nominations claiming to be either to busy or
uninterested. Frustrated by the process, 1947 Portland JACLVice President Paul
Oyamada wrote Mas Satow, JACL national secretary, asking for help in persuading
356
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members to accept leadership. Satow replied that the problem was widespread,
mentioning how the lone candidate in Los Angeles withdrew after he was elected.
Furthermore, in Chicago five members turned down the presidency in 1946.359
Ironically, in 1948, Oyamada turned down a position as leader of the Political Action
committee of the Portland JACL, although he agreed to maintain a role as speaker
before other organizations and member of the deputation committee of the Portland
JACL-ADC.360
Often in early postwar Portland, Nisei leaders like Azumano, Oyamada, and
Hachiya embraced the JACL-ADC’s letter-writing network and an opportunity to
work with outside groups on broader social justice issues. The JACL-ADC followed
the model laid out by national leaders in the Membership Campaign bulletin as
follows:
1. Receive information emanating from Washington. (Here after Progress
Reports will be sent to the Chairman of the Anti-Discrimination Committee
instead of the Chapter President)
2. Keep local people informed of developments.
3. Plan and activate local action in cooperation with the National Legislative
program.
4. Keep the Washington ADC office informed of local developments that may
have bearing upon the priorities adopted by ADC as outlined in “Statement by
Mike Masaoka, Director of JACL ADC January 7, 1947.”
5. Cooperate with the local Chapter Public Relations Committee in the
cultivation of strategic contacts in the community.
6. Recruit additional memberships and solicit funds for the Anti-Discrimination
Committee361
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These guidelines called for a direct information pipeline to Masaoka in Washington as
well as an ideological commitment to his strategy in securing pro-Japanese legislation.
In the days before crucial votes in U.S. Congress, such as the Evacuation Claims act in
1948 and versions of legislation designed to secure citizenship for Issei like the
successful Walter-MacCarran Act of 1952, Masaoka would send a telegram to a local
ADC office calling on white community leaders to write their congressional officials.
Collectively, these leaders were often called the “Caucasian advisory board.”362 Later,
Masaoka explained the role of these advisory boards more explicitly:
It is suggested that every chapter arrange to have a group of non-Japanese
friends who know the congressmen personally to call upon them and urge them
to support our legislative program. Such deputations should be followed up by a
group of chapter members calling upon these same congressmen….Members of
any deputation should be thoroughly grounded in the background and the
reasons for this legislation. This is particularly true for our non-Japanese friends.
No Nisei should be in these groups, in order that these non-Japanese citizens can
call upon congressmen as constituents and friends.
They were also encouraged not to pressure congressmen. They were trying to
encourage friendly interaction on the issue.363 In a sense the national ADC sought a
grass roots movements of white advocates for civil rights, with local Nisei playing a
supporting role.
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In 1947 and 1948, Azumano, as head of the Portland-ADC, tasked a deputation
team to write up a contact list for the Caucasian advisory board to be sent to the
national offices. The effort was an attempt to ensure continued support of Portland
Citizen’s Committee Members, progressives like Gus Solomon and Monroe
Sweetland, and Portland civic leaders like E. B. MacNaughton, who spoke out against
the Japanese Exclusion League in 1945. The list also included former missionaries to
Japan, like Alice Finley and Cora Oliver, local labor leader Irving Enna, and African
American Edwin Berry of the Portland Urban League.364 Minamoto, who served on
the deputation team, expressed some concern in sending their list to the national JACL
because she knew they would be asked to “write, wire or telephone their
Representatives or Senators when requested to do so by Washington, D. C. Office
[ADC].” Minamoto knew they would be asking a lot of their Caucasian friends, so she
proposed to ask every member on the list if they would be willing to help.365
Responses to these letters are telling of perceptions of Japanese American in the
Portland community in 1948. For instance, Marshall N. Dana, editor of the Oregon
Journal editorial page, responded:
I think there is a great deal of justice in the appeal for the grant of citizenship to
those Japanese born in Japan who have demonstrated their loyalty to the United
States and who are themselves parents of loyal American-born Nisei. I doubt,
however, the desirability of pressing a measure of this kind until the effectuation
of the peace treaty between Japan and the United States.366
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Although Dana had spoken out in favor of Japanese American rights on his paper’s
editorial page and to audiences at a Portland JACL rally in February 1942, calling for
tolerance for “Americans with Oriental faces,” he was unwilling to advocate for
Nikkei after the war.367 His refusal reveals the transnational position that he saw
Japanese Americans occupying. He saw them as a bridge to Japan. Thus their fate
could not be decided until the postwar relationship between the U.S. and Japan was
again firmly established. Presumably, many former members of the 1945 pro-Japanese
alignment, such as Governor Charles Sprague, felt the same way and opted not to join
the Caucasian advisory board.
“Other Groups”
Occasionally, the Portland ADC used the Caucasian advisory board to help
support broader legislative efforts. For instance, Azumano wrote members of the
board in 1947 to support the Oregon Fair Employment Practices (FEP) Bill of 1947,
HB 385.368 The successful bill set up a labor board to ensure equitable employment for
women and minorities. Coincidentally, one of the first instances of public controversy
over employers ignoring the bill involved a Japanese American as well. In 1951,
disabled Nisei Veteran Sagie Nishioka scored the highest on a civil service exam of
three candidates for a job with the state tax commission. The commission decided,
however, not to hire Nishioka in the belief that the public would not want to deal with
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a Nisei clerk. After the Oregonian ran a series of articles about how the state tax
commission violated the FEP law, the tax board was forced to offer him a job.369
Cooperation with the Portland African American community by Portland JACL
and ADC members was small and on a personal basis. Azumano served as a Nisei
representative to the Portland NAACP and used the letter-writing network to support
Anti-Lynching legislation in the U.S. Congress in 1947.370 Paul Oyamada served on
the Masaoka-sponsored Civic Unity Council, but the effort failed in Portland due to
lack of local support by Portland Mayor Earl Riley.371 Oyamada instead served on the
Speaker’s Bureau for the Portland Council of Churches, along with Reverend Francis
M. Hayashi, speaking to local churches and civic groups.372 This largely religious
group functioned much like the Seattle Civic Unity Committee, providing education
on issues of discrimination in Portland.
A Minority Like Any Other
The Portland JACL and Portland-ADC suffered a severe lack of participation
and had a restrictive relationship with the national JACL, limiting their capacity to aid
Portland Nikkei. However, Portland JACL leaders approached two cases of
369
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discrimination, similar to issues faced by the Portland African American community,
with particular effectiveness: Nikkei blood segregation and aid to refugee Japanese
Americans in the aftermath of the flooding of the Vanport housing projects in 1948.
One of the greatest indications that military service by African Americans and
Japanese Americans did not ensure equality was the segregation of blood by race in
World War II and after. For instance, blood sent by the Red Cross to the European
front had to be segregated by race. By the beginning of World War II, scientists had
definitively proved that race played no significant factor in blood type. Despite this,
public conceptions about blood difference persisted, so the U.S. War department
advised military authorities not to mix blood, even though they knew there was no
basis for the segregation. Blood segregation by the Army and the Red Cross continued
until December 1950.373
The blood supply in Portland was not only divided between black and white
supplies, but Japanese as well. In August 1946, Dr. Robert Kinoshita discovered that
the Portland blood bank was short of Japanese blood, so he contacted national JACL
president Hito Okada to find out how to proceed.374 Soon after the Portland JACL
encouraged members to give blood and join a blood-donors list as a way to fill the
need without publicly challenging the absurdity of blood segregation in the short term,
while working to solve the problem in the long term. Archival records do not reflect
when Nikkei blood segregation ended, but by June 1947, Dr. Rieke at the Vanport
hospital JACL member Juneus Oba began a campaign to found a blood donor service
373

William H. Schneider, “Blood Transfusion Between the Wars,” Journal of the History of Medicine
and Allied Sciences, Vol. 50, Issue 2, pp. 220-222.
374
Hito Okada, letter to Mary Minamoto, 21 August 1946, Purple Hearts Convention Testimonial
Dinner, PDX JACL Collection.

375

that ignored the color line.

132
Mary Minamoto’s column provides a window into

Portland JACL sentiment on the issue:
Obviously the above program is an adoption of existing Jim Crow practices as
now exist in many Portland medical quarters but faced with the dilemma of
aiding persons in distress under existing circumstances, it is felt that for the
present, at least, a donor list for Japanese ancestry persons is a practical
approach to the problem in that immediate results are obtained. However, such a
setup should not be permanent as the pattern tends to become entrenched. So it
has been gratifying to learn that a committee of the Mult. County Medical
Society has been working on a community wide blood bank to be available to all
Portland Community members irrespective of race, color and creed.376
Minamoto demonstrated a firm belief in Portland’s turn toward civic nationalism.
Whereas Japanese Americans faced a broader type of Jim Crow style racism, she had
faith that such discrimination was temporary.
Racial restrictions and discriminatory sales practices by Portland realtors
prohibited African Americans and Japanese Americans alike from renting or
purchasing homes in white neighborhoods.377 Housing was hard to come by for
Japanese Americans because of a large wartime increase in Portland’s population, as
well as a restriction in the Portland Realty Board’s code that barred realtors from
selling to minorities on the grounds that it would lower home values.378 As a result,
900 Japanese Americans, the majority of the postwar Portland Nikkei population,
375
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Some realtors were

willing to canvass neighborhoods to make sure white neighbors would not object to
Nikkei moving in, reminding Japanese Americans that they were not welcome in a
majority of Portland’s neighborhoods.380 Subsequently, home ownership by Japanese
Americans in Portland was only about two percent and Portland Nikkei tended to be
segregated in the two former Portland Japan towns.381
Groups like the Urban League and Portland Council of Churches had long
protested housing discrimination, but Mayor Riley and Chester Moores, his appointee
to the Housing Authority of Portland (HAP) were uninterested in actions opposed by
realtors. Because Moores believed industrial uses were much more profitable, and that
the HAP’s main purpose was to make money for Portland developers, they saw fair
housing for minorities as a liability. Despite the lack of available housing, Moores
even wanted to close Vanport so that its land could be sold to industrial developers.382
Riley hoped the nonwhite residents would just leave after the war, and had a plan in
place to evict them from Vanport.383
An ugly public debate over the fate of Vanport was averted by catastrophe when
the entire city of Vanport was destroyed by flood on 30 May 1948. Despite days of
379
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advance notice of severe flooding to the Red Cross and Portland leadership, Vanport
was not evacuated ahead of the breach of a railroad dike. The HAP even distributed
flyers to Vanport residents claiming that there was no immediate danger of
flooding.384 In the aftermath of the flood the Portland JACL opened a relief station at
the J. K. Kida electronics store with the aid of the Red Cross. Thankfully, the majority
of Japanese Americans living in Vanport harbored enough distrust for Portland
leadership to not trust HAP flyers. 550 of the 900 Nikkei Vanport residents left ahead
of the flood, though many had only left for the day to attend Memorial Day services at
the Rose City Japanese Cemetery.385 Alan Hart, lawyer for the Namba test case, was
on his way to Vanport the morning of the flood to convince holdouts to leave before
the dike broke.386 Nearly all Nikkei residents escaped harm. Photographer Sadao
Mizuno and Izumi Oyama, Issei leader Iwao Oyama’s wife, who was hard of hearing,
were unfortunately among the few casualities of the flood.387
The Vanport disaster was also a good example of the way the JACL could
facilitate cooperation with white civic groups.388 Close connections with the Red
Cross by JACL members facilitated quick formation of a refugee shelter and aid center
at J. K. Kida electronics store so that the mostly non-English speaking Issei would not
have to go to Red Cross headquarters for aid and even provided the funds for Red
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Cross aid to homeless Issei.
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Members of the Japanese American community took in

the majority of refugees, many of whom stayed at Epworth Methodist and Nitiren
Buddhist Church, just as they did in the earliest days of the Japanese American return
to Portland.
The nation-wide network of JACL and ADC chapters collected donations for
refugees, netting $9,400 after national JACL president Hito Okada sent out a bulletin
seeking aid for Vanport flood victims.390 The funds went to refugees quickly. Within a
week of the Vanport flood the Portland JACL had received almost $7,000 in donations,
and the Portland Issei-Nisei Vanport Relief Committee had already distributed $5,200
of the funds.391 In the weeks after the flood the Portland JACL saw a surge in
membership and community support due to the aid of JACL chapters from over the
U.S.392
A Stronger Portland JACL?
Surprisingly, after the upswell of support for the Portland JACL in June 1948,
the chapter went inactive for three years. 393 Two factors explain the chapter’s
dormancy. First, with the Portland-ADC framework of funding and letter writing in
place, there were few local causes to rally behind. Masaoka saw the national
389
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legislative campaign, for Issei naturalization and the Evacuation claims Act as the
main goal of these networks.
The national JACL and ADC, since the beginning of internment, had ignored or
strongly discourage civil rights efforts, including Min Yasui’s test case, the motion to
overturn the Portland municipal business license ban, and the Alien Land Law Test
Committee. While many other Issei and Nisei in Portland were interested in broader
social justice issues, for all minorities, the Portland JACL encouraged participation in
such efforts only on an individual basis. The demands on JACL leaders were
particularly heavy, so when new leaders failed to volunteer for positions in 1948,
Kuge, Azumano, and others chose to focus more on their careers and families. Other
Portland JACL leaders, like Minamoto, continued their work on Nisei civil rights.
Furthermore, she continued to aid local Nikkei filing claims under the Evacuation
Claims Act of 1948.394
The second factor was financial. The ADC financial pipeline bypassed the
Portland JACL. Therefore, when the chapter became inactive in 1948, national ADC
leaders did not need to contact the Portland JACL, they merely wrote Issei leaders
Daiichi Takeoka, Iwao Oyama, and Masuo Yasui.395 That is until the Issei funding
pipeline started to run dry. National JACL leader Mas Satow told Azumano, “In this
connection [the ADC debt], I understand that Portland does have some money on hand
in its treasury, and I am wondering if the Portland Chapter can help us out.”396 The
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Issei funding connection through the ADC, it seems, was starting to run dry. Therefore,
the Portland chapter met again shortly after receiving the letter to elect leaders, though
no one showed interest in taking on the presidency until March when Azumano
“railroaded” Dr. Matthew Matsuoka, a Nisei with no prior experience with the JACL,
into the position.397 Thereafter, the chapter was much more active, but funding
continued to be a problem. Meanwhile local Japanese American businessmen focused
on building up successful businesses, such as the Azumano Insurance and Travel
Agencies, Umata Matsushima’s Anzen store and importing, Ted Hachiya’s Byron’s
Furniture, and Bill and Sam Naito’s Norcrest China.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion

After laying out the social and political environment in postwar Portland, the
reformation of the Portland JACL, and arguments made by the Japanese Americans
for acceptance and social justice after World War II, several questions of significance
remain. The return of Japanese Americans to Portland is more than a story of
rebuilding community after an unjust incarceration. Debates over the return of
Japanese Americans in 1945 highlight a schism between progressives, a shift to civic
nationalism, and the strengths and limitations of minority groups’ appeals to
patriotism based on service to the armed forces in World War II.
Placing Japanese Americans at the center of a narrative of Oregon
progressivism in the 1930s recovers figures such as Oregon Governor Walter M.
Pierce from a historical narrative of paradox. Pierce’s transnational, racially exclusive
progressivism sought to protect Oregon’s white producer class of farmers and workers
from conservative Portland business interests such as the Portland Chamber of
Commerce, and preventing Asian immigration that he believed posed a racial and
economic threat. For Pierce advocacy for public power and Japanese exclusion both
furthered the goal of protecting Oregon producers.
During the 1930s, support for the New Deal and public power brought Pierce
and the Oregon State Grange into alliance with labor leaders and civil rights
progressives, such as Gus J. Solomon and Monroe Sweetland in the Oregon
Commonwealth Federation (OCF). Sweetland and Solomon failed to protest Japanese
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incarceration in 1942 after the failure of a series of key public power ballot initiatives
in 1940, which proved to be the death knell for the OCF. Following the collapse of the
OCF alliance in 1940, civil rights progressivism faltered in Oregon because of a lack
of organization and the defection of Pierce and others who used the Pearl Harbor
incident as a pretext to support the exclusion of Japanese Americans.
Between 1942 and 1945 a debate in public and in the press over the right of
Japanese Americans to return to Oregon embodied a shift from racial nationalism to
civic nationalism. Although the American Legion, the Portland City Council, Pierce,
Oregon Legislator Thomas Mahoney, and the Japanese Exclusion League all argued
that Japanese Americans held racial loyalty to the Japanese Empire and must not be
allowed to return to Oregon, their calls were unsuccessful. Civic leaders, such as
banker E. B. MacNaughton, religious groups like the Portland Council of Churches,
the lawyer Solomon, the Portland Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation, and
returning white soldiers won the day by branding anti-Japanese organizers as fascists.
The loudest proponents for one-hundred-percent-Americanism were the ones branded
as un-American by summer 1945.
Portland’s shift to civic nationalism excised Asian exclusion from the bounds
of publicly acceptable progressivism while expanding the definition of Americanism
to include Japanese Americans. Racial exclusion was no longer an acceptable public
argument and Pierce became a rural, reactionary relic of an earlier age of intolerance.
Solomon, who became the head of the Oregon ACLU in 1944, and other civil rights
progressives, continued to support rural public power efforts, but more actively

pursued civil rights reform in the postwar.
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For instance, in 1950 the Progressive

Party of Oregon wholeheartedly supported an effort by Portland Mayor Dorothy
McCollough Lee to remove the controversial “white trade only” signs from downtown
hotels and restaurants. An article in the Oregonian reveals disdain for prejudice that
progressives tolerated before World War II:
The social and economic justice for this ordinance [to remove “white trade
only” signs] has its very roots in the fact that general welfare of the Portland
community will be enhanced through the eradication of a festering sore that
reveals “second-class” citizenship and “Jim Crow” in its naked ugly form. The
extension of service by all public places licensed by the city is a necessary step
in this direction.399
While many racially exclusive progressives saw Japanese Americans as the race
problem, civil rights progressives saw white supremacy as the real race problem. Of
course anti-Japanese discrimination in employment, housing, and vandalism of the
Rose City Japanese Cemetery continued until 1948 and possibly after.400
Studying the return of Japanese Americans to Oregon, especially the JACL’s
embrace of the Nisei Patriotism argument, allows us to broaden the focus of Japanese
American history beyond the civil rights approach. The main factor that brought
Portland’s white community and its Japanese American community together was the
argument that Nisei military service proved the loyalty of Japanese Americans. The
argument led church groups and civic leaders to marginalize race-based nationalism
and served as a keystone for Mike Masaoka’s legislative campaign for Issei
398

Gus Solomon continued membership in the Oregon Committee of the Public Power League of
America throughout 1945 and after. He served on the executive board until at least the end of 1945
along with wartime anti-Japanese organizers, such as Morton Tompkins of the Oregon Grange, and one
of Walter Pierce’s close associates Vernon Bull. Carl D. Thompson, Letter to Walter M. Pierce, 8
January 1945, Box 16, Folder 8, Pierce Papers, University of Oregon Archives.
399
“Local Groups Support Ban on Discrimination,” Oregonian, 10 July 1950, p. 4.
400
“Minutes,” Minutes, PDX JACL Collection.

141
naturalization and the Evacuation Claims Act. Furthermore, the focus on military
service was at the heart of the Portland JACL’s postwar revival.401
The JACL’s Nisei Patriotism argument was not without is limitations. To
begin with, many Nisei questioned JACL leadership because of the JACL’s wartime
collaboration with federal authorities and the JACL’s obsession with becoming the
chief representative of the Japanese American community. Many Portland Nisei
refused to participate in chapter activities because they saw the JACL as mainly
interested in aiding the Issei. Furthermore, the Nisei patriotism argument itself
marginalized draft resisters, repatriates, and other Nikkei who were unwilling to fight
for a government that had incarcerated them. Because the legitimacy of Japanese
Americans claims to their constitutional rights depended upon a narrative of military
service, those that stood up the most for their constitutional rights, such as the Heart
Mountain draft resisters, were those that were the most marginalized in the postwar.
Unfortunately, accounts of the intense bitterness experienced by Japanese Americans
who resisted American authorities rarely survive into the present day, making
inclusion of their struggles difficult.402
Efforts by the Portland Citizen’s Committee to Aid Relocation and the
Portland Council of Churches were also limited in that they raised the public status of
Japanese Americans from possible wartime enemy, but only to the limit status of
provisional, honorary Americans. In housing, employment, and blood segregation,
401
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Portland Nikkei faced the same discrimination as African Americans. Japanese
Americans were just one group aided by a wide variety of civic and religious groups
interested in proving the fair-mindedness of Portland on issues of race.
That is not to say that Japanese Americans successfully shed their transnational
identity. Even before World War II, members of the Portland JACL sought to publicly
distance itself from its Japanese heritage after tensions mounted between Japan and
the U.S.403 However, though a connection to the 442nd Regimental Combat Team
helped Japanese Americans argue for their constitutional rights during and after World
War II, the white community still saw them as transnational figures. For Mayor Earl
Riley and Pierce, Japanese Americans were still basically equal to citizens of the
Japanese Empire who constituted a racial threat to Oregon.
Some white Portlanders supported Japanese Americans out of a desire to
protect people of Japanese descent, not out of a need to protect the rights of all
American citizens. In 1942 pro-Japanese missionaries, like Emma Azalia Peet, had
spoken out for fair treatment of Japanese Americans because her extended experience
with Japanese in Japan.404 Marshal Dana, editor of the Oregon Journal, who gave an
impassioned speech for tolerance of Japanese Americans in 1942, declined to
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participate in Caucasian advisory board letter writing campaigns in 1947 because he
did not want to upset peace treaty negotiations between Japan and the U.S.405 Unlike
European immigrants, Japanese Americans could not truly assimilate into the white
majority. Visible otherness prevented it. As Portland JACL leader Howard Nomura
put it, “we have Japanese faces and nothing can be done about it.”406
That is not to say that sentiment towards Japanese Americans did not change
over time. By 1948, Portland’s shift towards civic nationalism led to the election of
Dorothy McCullough Lee as Portland mayor. The change in leadership marked a shift
in the city’s official attitude towards people of Japanese ancestry. In 1950, a group of
Nisei veterans and other Japanese American community leaders calling themselves the
Japanese American Memorial League collected funds to erect a monument to Frank
Hachiya and the fourteen other Nisei soldiers who died during World War II. Over one
hundred Portland Nikkei attended the ceremony, proclaiming, in the words of Oregon
Nisei Veterans leader Dr. George Y. Marumoto, that “They have earned the right for
their families and themselves to share in the American way of life.” Speaking at the
funeral, Mayor Lee also attested to the importance of the Nisei soldiers’ military
service:
The one thing that these men might want us to do would be to attempt to live
our lives as citizens of this great country in a way that carries out the spiritual
values for which they died. With all deference to this monument, there could
be no memorial, which could do justice to the sacrifice of these young
Americans.407
405
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Lee’s acceptance of the Nisei, as full-fledged Americans was a marked difference
compared to Riley’s calls for exclusion.
Lee’s public gestures of friendship were not limited to Japanese Americans. In
1952, Lee accepted from Consul Masayuki Harigai two thousand cherry seeds as a
symbolic gift from the school children of Japan. Edgar Smith, president of the
Portland Chamber of Commerce, was also present at the gift ceremony, signaling that
good relations with Japan were once again a chief interest to Portland businessmen.408
Individual accounts of housing discrimination and Sagie Nishioka’s rebuff by
the Oregon tax commission attest to continuing anti-Japanese sentiment in Portland.
However the shift towards public acceptance of Japanese American constitutional
rights by Portland officials and community leaders discouraged further anti-Japanese
acts. Although the leadership of the Portland JACL may not have accomplished a
seamless integration into postwar American life, the Nisei patriotism argument served
as a powerful and positive point of contact between the white and Japanese American
communities in the postwar.
This work provides only a glimpse into the issues of identity and visions of the
future negotiated in Portland surrounding the status of Japanese Americans before and
after internment. Although it is important to recognize that for Japanese Americans the
return period between 1945 and 1948 was a time of recovery from the ideological and
economic trauma of internment, the return affected more than just them. The return of
408
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Japanese Americans sparked a public reevaluation among Portlanders of the place of
ethnic minorities in American society. Most importantly debates around the return
refuted, in terms of publicly acceptable discourse, the vision of Oregon as a white
man’s haven endangered by Asian immigration. Thus, the story of Japanese
Americans’ return to Portland is more than just a chapter in the history of an American
minority group’s struggle for acceptance. The return story highlights origins of civil
rights coalitions and early postwar attempts, through the challenge of racially
discriminatory laws and public education, to ease interracial tensions in Oregon.
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